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The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence
in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact
of National and International Jurisprudence and
Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges
Shimon Shetreet*
I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the culture of judicial independence has been a combined
process of national and international developments. The process consists of a
cycle of normative and conceptual impact of national law on international law
and later, of international law on national law. In the cycle's first phase, which
began in 1701 with England's enactment of the Act of Settlement,' judicial
independence was conceived domestically. In the second phase, which began
shortly thereafter, this domestic development crossed national boundaries and
impacted the thinking of scholars and political leaders in the international
community. It brought about the formulation of established principles of judicial
independence on the transnational levels, both regional and global. In the third
phase, in which we find ourselves today, the international law of judicial
independence begins to impact the domestic laws of nations with significant and
even dramatic results.
The impact of international law on judicial independence has been
influenced by international human rights treaties that contain principles on fair
procedure and the right to be tried before an impartial and independent
tribunal.2 International standards of judicial independence have made significant
Greenblatt Professor of International and Public Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. E-mail:
mshetree@mscc.huji.ac.il.
I See generally Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial- A Study of the Appointment and Acountabili y of the
Eng,'sh Judidary (N Holland 1976).
2 These provisions include Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General
Assembly Res No 217A (Ill), UN Doc A/810 (1948), which states, "Everyone is entitled in full
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal"; Article 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 218 UN
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contributions to local rules, which have been reinforced by international
jurisprudence.3 Some of the most influential international standards were drafted
by professional nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. One
recent example is the Mt. Scopus International Standards on Judicial Independence ("Mt.
Scopus Standard?').4 Conceived in 2007, when an international group of legal
academics and professional jurists developed the vision of revised minimum
standards on judicial independence, the document was finalized in 2008. The
development of the Mt. Scopus Standards was necessitated by the absence of a
modern, thorough revision of standards for both national and international
judges. This dearth was problematic. In order for standards to remain relevant
and to continue as cornerstones for the substantive protection of human rights
and a healthy economic state, it was critical that they be contemporary.
The Mt. Scopus Standards are based on a number of sources: The Burgh House
Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciag,5 the International Bar
Treaty Ser 221 (1950) ("ECHR"), Section 1 of which provides, "In the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law";
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Res No
2200 Supp No 16, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar 23, 1976), paragraph 1 of
which provides, "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law"; Article 8 of The American Convention on
Human Rights (1969), 1114 UN Treaty Set 123 (1978) ("American Convention"), paragraph 1 of
which provides, "Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, previously established by
law"; Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), 21 ILM 58, Section
1 of which provides, "Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This
comprises:... (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal";
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 OJ (C 364) 10,
which provides,
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions
laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.
Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal
aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is
necessary to ensure effective access to justice.
3 See, for example, Procola v LuxembouT, 326 Eur Ct HR (set A) (1995); McGonnell v United Kingdom,
30 Eur HR Rep 289 (2000); Findlay v UnitedtKingdom, 24 Eur HR Rep 221 (1997).
4 Mt. Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial Independence (Mar 19, 2008), available
online at <http://aw.huji.ac.il/upload/InternationalStandardsofJudicialInd2008.doc> (visited
May 19, 2009).
The Burgh House Prnples on the Independence of the Internalional Judiciay (2004), available online at
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/burgh_final_21204.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
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Association's Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence ("IBA Standard"),6
the Tokyo Principles on the Independence of the Judiciay in the Lawasia Region,7 Universal
Declaration on the Independence of Justice,8 Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiiay,9 and the Revised Draft of Proposed New Canon to American Bar Association's
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct.'0
Principles of independence in the judiciary are essential for ensuring the
rule of law, protecting human rights, and securing the continued preservation
and development of democratic societies. As such, these international standards
have had a positive impact on the creation of a culture of judicial independence
as an established and accepted system of conceptual principles. These principles
are essential for ensuring the rule of law, protecting human rights, and securing
the continued preservation and development of democratic societies. Vic Toews,
Canada's former Minister of Justice and Attorney General, succinctly explained:
It goes without saying that the rule of law requires a robust and independent
judiciary. An effective judicial system inhibits both the state and private
parties from acting arbitrarily. This helps promote social stability, progress
and prosperity. An independent judiciary is necessary to provide definitive
judgments on the interpretation of the law and how it is applied to
particular disputes.'"
I was privileged to help guide the creation of one of the earlier set of
standards of judicial independence, the IBA Standards, adopted and confirmed at
the 1982 IBA convention in New Delhi. The IBA Standards were produced at
the end of a three-year project with the participation of over sixty international
scholars and professionals.'l I am now privileged to serve once again in the
leadership of an academic and professional project to develop revised
6 International Bar Association Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (1982), available online
at <http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/Minimum%20Standards%2ofo/ 20Judicial%
20Independence%201982.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
7 Tokyo Principles on the Independence of the Judiciay in the Lawasia Region (1982); Shimon Shetreet, Judical
Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and Contemporary Challenges, in Shimon Shetreet and Jules
Desch~nes, eds, Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate 441-46 (M. Nijhoff 1985).
8 Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice (1983), in Shetreet and Desch~nes, Judicial
Independence: The Contemporary Debate at 447-61 (cited in note 7).
9 United Nations, Basic Puinciples on the Independence of the Judidagy, UN Doc A/CONF.121/22/Rev. 1
(1985).
10 Revised Draft of Proposed New Canon to American BarAssociation's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct (2005).
11 Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Address to the Commonwealth
Magistrates' and Judges' Association (Sept 10, 2006), available online at
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/spe-disc/2006/doc_31872.html> (visited Apr 23,
2009).
12 See Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 590 (cited in note 7).
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international standards of judicial independence for national judges and
international judges.13
In this Article, I will discuss domestic and international law as they relate to
judicial independence, and how their interrelationship impacts judicial
independence in both arenas. I will also note current challenges to judicial
independence, on both practical and theoretical levels, and suggest some
appropriate solutions. Section I reviews the three phases of judicial
independence, using England as a case study. Section II considers fundamental
concepts surrounding judicial independence: models, principles, and
constitutionalism. It is important to review these normative concepts in order to
create a common language of judicial independence. Section III explores
challenges to judicial independence, both past and present. Section IV analyzes
the response to these challenges: the creation of a culture of judicial
independence. Section V evaluates the different components that have been, and
that continue to be, critical to the culture of judicial independence. Cultures of
judicial independence are built on both the domestic and international fronts,
and in their more advanced stages consist of a combination of national and
international law and jurisprudence. Section VI examines how the
interrelationships between domestic law, international human rights law, and
professional international standards have had a normative effect on the culture
of judicial independence over its three phases. Particular attention is paid to
England, the US, Austria, and Canada, with special reference where appropriate
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"),14 and the UK's Human Rights Act 5 and
Constitutional Reforms Act.16 This Article concludes with a look to the future.
II. THE THREE PHASES OF SHAPING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
As noted in the introduction, there is a cycle of normative and conceptual
impact of national law on international law, and subsequent impact of
13 Shimon Shetreet, Proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference on Judidal Independence (Mar 2008).
14 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UN
Treaty Ser 221, available online at <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-
4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
15 Human Rights Act 1998, ch 42 (1998) (UK), available online at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/actsl998/ukpga_19980042en1 > (visited Apr 23, 2009).
16 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, ch 4 (2005) (UK), available online at
<http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=Act+CUK+Pubic+General)&title=cons
titutional+reform&searchEnacted=0&exten'latchOnly=0&confersPower=0&blanketAmendme
nt=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber= 1&NavFrom=0&activeTextDocld=1 974 190&p
arentActi> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
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international law on national law. The United Kingdom provides a most
instructive illustration of this phenomenon.
The first phase is characterized by the domestic development of the
concept of judicial independence, the second by the seeping of this concept into
the international scene, and the third by the re-domestication of newly
reformulated international principles of judicial independence, with significant
and dramatic results.
The first phase occurred in England with the original conception of
judicial independence in the Act of Settlement in 1701.'7 The second phase was
evident when England's concepts regarding judicial independence first entered
the international scene and from there moved into the domestic arenas of other
countries. For instance, England served as the theoretical model for
Montesquieu's separation-of-powers doctrine."8 Also, the Founding Fathers of
the US Constitution used England as their dominant model in formulating the
Constitution's Article III, which is the foundation of American judicial
independence. 9 Other common law countries, including Canada, Australia, and
India, also adopted the British model of judicial independence."
In recent decades the third phase of judicial independence has come into
play in the United Kingdom, as the country has been significantly influenced by
judicial independence principles developed by international human rights
constitutional documents. I refer to the significant impact of the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") on the conceptual analysis
of judicial independence in England and Scotland. This process began in the
1990s with cases heard by the ECtHR before the United Kingdom adopted the
Human Rights Act.2' Later, this process found dramatic expression in the
application of the ECHR in the British Human Rights Act, which came into
force in 2000.22
17 See generally Shetreet, Judges on Trial (cited in note 1).
18 See Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Hafner 1949) (Thomas Nugent, trans).
19 Article III of the US Constitution provides that "the judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their
services, a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
20 Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 590 (cited in note 7). See also John Bell, Judicial Cultures and Judidal
Independence, 4 Cambridge YB Eur Legal Studies 47 (2001); Peter H. Russell, TheJudidagy in Canada:
The Third Branch of Government (McGraw-Hill Ryerson 1987).
21 See note 3.
22 Human Rights Act 1998 (cited in note 16).
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Whereas the British national law previously impacted the international law
of judicial independence, the British Constitutional Reform Act of 200523
signaled a shift, with international law now impacting British domestic law. As
will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this Article, the
Constitutional Reform Act dramatically reformed government control over the
administration of justice in England and Wales; importantly, it discontinued the
aberrant position of the Lord Chancellor, one of the country's oldest
constitutional offices, who was entrusted with a combination of legislative,
executive, and judicial capacities. The Lord Chancellor served as speaker of the
Upper House of Parliament, the House of Lords; he served as a member of the
executive branch and member of the senior cabinet; and he also served as the
head of the judiciary. The Constitutional Reform Act established new lines of
demarcation between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary, transferring all the
judicial functions to the judiciary and entrusting the Lord Chancellor only with
what are considered administrative and executive matters.
Thus, the United Kingdom, where the first phase of judicial independence
began over three hundred years ago, illustrates vividly the mutual impact of
national and international law and jurisprudence in the area of judicial
independence. It demonstrates a cycle of mutual normative impact and cross-
conceptual fertilization. In this process, concepts and ideas have become
enriched as they have been implemented in successive judicial and political
systems, as each system has enhanced and deepened the concepts and ideas it
actualized. In addition to the United Kingdom's instructive illustration, similar
developments of conceptual cross-fertilization can be seen internationally-in
21 *vllwcEU law, in civil law countries such as Austria, and in other common law
jurisdictions such as Canada.25
This Article will review judicial independence in all three phases, in an
effort to show how the relationship between domestic and international law
23 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (cited in note 16). For a detailed analysis of the history of this
act, see Lord Windlesham, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: The Politics of Constitutional Reform,
2006 Pub L 35; Lord Windlesham, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and
Constitutional Change, 2005 Pub L 806. For accounts of the main players, see Lord Woolf, The
Pursuit of Justice 161-74 (Oxford 2008); Lord Phillips, Constitutional Reform: One Year On, The
Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture (Mar 22, 2007); Lord Woolf, The Rule of Law and a Change in
the Constitution, 2004 Camb L J 317; Tom Bingham, The Business ofjudging: Selected Essays and Speeches
55-68 (Oxford 2000). All three authors served as Lord Chief Justice in these formative years.
Lord Woolf was active in the shaping of the legislation and Lord Phillips succeeded him.
24 See Treaty on European Union, art F, 1992 OJ (C 191) 1 (ul 29, 1992). Paragraph 2 of Article F
states, "The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law."
25 See, for example, Valente v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 673 (Canada).
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affects judicial independence in both arenas. The next section will review the
models of interrelations of international and domestic law, using the United
States as the main case study with reference to other jurisdictions. Then, the
Article will analyze basic judicial independence principles, including personal or
substantive independence, collective independence, and internal independence.
Later, the Article will discuss constitutional protection of judicial independence,
including the required components of such protection.
III. MODELS OF RELATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. THE MODELS
The relationships between domestic and international human rights law can
be measured and classified according to a number of possible yardsticks. The
classic distinction is between the monist and dualist schools regarding the
transformation of treaties into national law. According to the monist school,
treaties become the law of the land of ratifying countries, whereas according to
the dualist school, a ratified treaty is transformed into the national law only
through the implementation of legislation.26 In addition, there is a practice of
referring to international law in the course of interpretation. One such example
is South Africa.
The South African Constitution demands that constitutional interpretation
take foreign law into account. It also authorizes domestic courts to consider
foreign law in deciding cases.27 Similarly, in common law countries, references to
UK law are normal and frequent. One study showed that the Supreme Court of
Canada referred to at least one UK case in close to half of its decisions between
1984 and 1995.28
Customary law is held binding on national laws whether or not a treaty has
been implemented into the national law in accordance with the constitutional
requirements of each jurisdiction. Thus international jurisprudence generally
impacts the legal arguments presented by lawyers acting before national courts.
Judgments rendered in national courts are often at least partly based on
principles developed in the international arena-by tribunals, courts, treaties,
26 See generally Thomas Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton, and David Stewart, International Human Rights
(West 3d ed 2002).
27 See South Africa Const, art 39(1).
28 C.L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein, and Craig R. Ducat, Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change:
Explaining the Citations of Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada, 34 Can J Pol Sci 377, 386-
87 (2001).
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conventions, and international standards developed by professional groups-
even prior to their formalization into treaties.
Vicki Jackson proposes a second, three-pronged model. Jackson's model
categorizes relationships between international and national law as a resistance,
convergent, or engagement model.2 9  The resistance model (analogous
conceptually to the dualist school) vigorously rejects outside influences on
domestic law. The downside of this school is that in doing so, fewer
opportunities are provided for revealing or correcting errors in domestic laws.30
In contrast, the convergent model (analogous to the monist school) considers
domestic legal systems to be open to outside influences, the crosscurrents of
which lead to the general homogenization of legal norms across multiple
domestic systems. The middle position, the engagement model, recognizes
domestic legal system engagement with transnational legal influences. According
to this model, the domestic system is cognizant of, and to some degree accepting
of, outside legal influences, but borrows from abroad within the confines of its
own constitutional context.31
B. THE MODELS AS REFLECTED IN US CASE LAW AND IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The United States provides a good example of the interrelationships
between international and domestic law. It paints a picture of a state that, despite
having a general aversion to international law, also has a long history of
references to external sources, a practice that has been markedly increasing over
the last couple of decades.
The recourse to the international law by American judges has historically
been minimal compared to their counterparts in Europe and other common law
countries. Arguments against the use of international law have included the fear
of foreign domination, the fear of judicial activism, and the fear of the
unknown. 32 However, in the last two decades US courts have increasingly relied
29 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 Harv L Rev 109,
109-28 (2005).
30 For a discussion of an exclusionist form of sovereigntism, see Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation:
'Foreign" Law, Democratic Federalism, and the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 Ind J of Const L 33
(2007).
31 For a more extensive discussion of this modular approach, see Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons
at 114-15 (cited in note 29). See also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 Harv L Rev 1147, 1154 (1993).
32 Austen Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The US Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U III L Rev 637,
650-51 (2007).
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on international practices regarding human rights and judicial independence as
background sources to domestic cases.33
The US experience can be categorized, according to Jackson's model, in a
number of schools.34 The resistance school is advanced by Justice Scalia. For
example, in Roper v Simmons, 35 he vigorously rejected outside influences on
domestic law. However, it can also be said that the US Supreme Court practices
the engagement model, for international law always has been, and continues to
be, relevant to US constitutional interpretation, with several clauses in the
Constitution making open reference to institutions of international law.36 These
references assume an international law background, which, in the course of
adjudication and in interpreting the constitutional texts, provides an essential
resource for judicial deliberations. For example, foreign law plays a well-known
and central role in the debates over the relationship between the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has also invoked
international and foreign sources in construing other constitutional
amendments, including the Thirteenth Amendment, the Eighteenth
Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. After the Second World War,
international human rights law further widened the field of interaction between
international law and constitutional interpretation. In recent years, the spread of
rights-based constitutionalism has further increased the opportunity for
comparative use of foreign constitutional law. However, currently the Supreme
Court does not construe constitutional rights so as to implement the obligations
of international human rights treaties, a practice of some domestic constitutional
courts in other countries. Rather, in the United States, international law is used
merely as one of many elements in the judicial inquiry into constitutional
interpretation, as illustrated in Lawrence v Texas.37 Gerald Neuman observed that
the decision in Lawrence provides an illustration of the appropriate use of
international law as one of many elements in a complex inquiry into
constitutional interpretation. 38 He concludes, "That kind of inquiry creates no
danger that foreign powers will dictate constitutional law to the United States, or
33 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 575 (2005); Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558, 571 (2003).
34 See generally Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons (cited in note 29).
35 Roper, 543 US at 622-28.
36 Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of
History, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No 954359 at 12 (Dec 15, 2006); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Uses oflntemationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 98 Am J Ind L 82 (2004).
37 The opinion in Lawrence cites King v Wiseman, 92 Eng Rep 774, 775 (KB 1718), as well as a
decision of the European Court of Human Rights. 539 US at 568, 573. However, foreign law is
not given higher importance than domestic law or US academic writers. See also Neuman, 98 Am
J Intl L at 83-84 (cited in note 36).
38 Id at 89.
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that the political branches can manipulate the content of the Bill of Rights by
entering into a treaty.,
39
Another example in which the US Supreme Court cited to international
documents is Hamdan v Rum eld.40 There the Court held that special military
commissions established to try non-US service members are not exempt from
judicial review.4' The court considered whether the special military commission
set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay violated
federal law and whether Congress is permitted to pass legislation preventing
accused combatants from being heard by the Supreme Court prior to the
military commission. In granting the petition of habeas corous, the court held that
constitutional principles are to be applied to military commissions and that
courts may enforce articles of the Geneva Convention.42 Thus, despite the
general US distaste for using law from outside its borders, there are examples of
the Court referring to international law in making its domestic decisions.
The question of whether to consider international law and the experience
of foreign nations in interpreting the US Constitution should not be seen as an
ideological matter. Both schools of judicial orientation, the liberal and the
conservative, can and should view the normative resources in international law
and jurisprudence as having persuasive value. Whether we adopt the dualist or
monist schools of thought, or the resistance, convergent, engagement
classifications, it is evident that international human rights treaties and
international jurisprudence play a vital role in the thinking and shaping of
concepts, ideas, and attitudes of the national judiciary in adjudicating
constitutional cases.
IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE-THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
It should be noted at the outset that just as there are varying models of the
relationship between international and domestic law, there are different
principles of judicial independence.
1. Personal and Substantive Independence
Individual judges must enjoy both personal and substantive independence,
both of which are necessary to protect judges from threats to their personal or
39 Id at 90.
40 Hamdan v Rumfeld, 548 US 557 (2006).
41 Id at 613-17.
42 Id.
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professional security that may influence their official duties.43 Characteristics of
personal independence include security of office, life tenure, and adequate
remuneration and pensions. Substantive independence refers to the freedom of
judges to perform their judicial functions independently." The Mt. Scopus
Standards require that both personal and substantive independence be
preserved.45
2. Collective Independence
The development of the judiciary as a significant social institution with an
important constitutional role requires that the concept of judicial independence
not be confined to the independence of the individual judge. It must also extend
to the independence of the judiciary as a whole, under the rubric of collective
independence. It is widely recognized that interference with the independence of
individual judges is considered a serious infringement of the rule of law.46
Interference with the collective independence of the judiciary also has an adverse
impact on individual judges as they discharge their official duties. This is due to
the fact that the traditional sense of social responsibility that the judiciary
imparts on individual judges is a strong instrument for ensuring its
independence. Interference with the judiciary as a whole is, therefore, likely to
have a negative impact on the sense of independence of individual judges. The
collective independence is protected by the rules outlined above in Section II,
which deals with the constitutional position of the judiciary. The Mt. Scopus
Standards refer to these aspects in sections 2.12 and 2.13.
43 See Sandra Day O'Connor, The Importance ofJudidal Independence, Remarks before the Arab Judicial
Forum (Sept 15, 2003) in Issues of Democrat7 25 (March 2004), available online at
<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ej/ijde0304.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
4 See Shetreet, Judidal Independence at 594-99 (cited in note 7); Lucie Atkins, The Shifing Focus of
Judicial Reform: From Independence to Capacity, in EUMAP (Aug 2002), available online at
<http://www.eumap.org/joumal/features/2002/augO2/indeptocapacity> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
45 Section 2.2 makes the distinction between personal and substantive independence. 2.2: "Each
judge shall enjoy both personal independence and substantive independence." 2.2.1: "Personal
independence means that the terms and conditions of judicial service are adequately secured by
law so as to ensure that individual judges are not subject to executive control." 2.2.2: "Substantive
independence means that in the discharge of his judicial function, a judge is subject to nothing but
the law and the commands of his conscience." Mt. Scopus Standards (cited in note 4).
46 Shetreet, Judidal Independence at 643 (cited in note 7).
47 Section 2.12 states, "Judicial matters are exclusively within the responsibility of the Judiciary, both
in central judicial administration and in court level judicial administration." Section 2.13 states,
"The central responsibility for judicial administration shall preferably be vested in the Judiciary or
jointly in the Judiciary and the Executive."
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3. Court Administration
In practice, collective independence is seen in the structure of court
48administration. There are three different models of collective independence.
These models are the joint executive-judicial model, the exclusive judicial model,
and the shared responsibility model. The Mt. Scopus Standards, like the IBA
Standards, express the position that the shared responsibility model is the best
approach for the administration of lower courts in parliamentary systems of
government. 49 It should be clarified that the executive may share responsibilities
for court administration only on the central level (as distinguished from
managing such matters at the court level, which will be inappropriate) but
should be barred from intervention in judicial matters and should also be barred
from involvement in judicial administration on the local level or in specific cases.
Adjudicative functions of judges should remain independent from
directives or pressures from peers or superior judges. Adjudication is composed
of three main parts: administration, procedure, and substance.5" Judges have
administrative responsibility for managing their cases, setting hearing dates,
managing their workloads, and expediting hearings and the resolution of cases
when appropriate. Judges also have procedural functions for conducting the trial
itself by way of regulating the trial process according to the rules of evidence and
procedure, and ruling on procedural motions. A judge's substantive duties
involve findings of fact and applying the relevant legal norms to the facts of the
case to reach a resolution. This may also involve the extension of existing legal
norms and the creation of new legal doctrines.
The development of the judiciary as a significant social institution with an
important constitutional role requires that the concept of judicial independence
not be confined to the personal and substantive independence of the individual
judge, but rather that it extend to the independence of the judiciary as a whole.
4. Internal Independence
Internal judicial independence can be considered collective independence
but on a micro level. It demands that individual judges be free from unjustified
influences not only from entities external to the judiciary, but also from within.
48 For details on this classification of the models of responsibility of court administration, see
Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 644-53 (cited in note 7).
49 Mt. Scopus Standards, § 10.13 (cited in note 4) ("The court shall be free to determine the conditions
for its internal administration, including staff recruitment policy, information systems and
allocation of budgetary expenditure."). See id, § 10.4 (regarding confidentiality of deliberations).
However, it is not appropriate for the executive to be involved or to have responsibility over
judicial matters or judicial functions. See also id, § 10.9, 10.12.
50 See Shetreet, Judidal Independence at 590-601 (cited in note 7).
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With regard to certain types of adjudicative functions, independence requires
that judges be free from directives or pressures from peers or those who have
administrative responsibilities in the court such as the chief judge of the court or
the head of the division in the court."' Adjudicative functions are those official
functions for which judges are responsible in the discharge of their official
duties. As with collective independence, they are threefold, as mentioned above:
administrative, procedural, and substantive.
It can be argued that internal independence is applicable only to the
substantive and procedural aspects of adjudication. 2 This is because, as a general
rule, a judge cannot rely on internal independence as a shield against guidance by
other judges who are responsible for court administration.
The substantive and procedural aspects of adjudication vary in different
legal systems, as do approaches toward recognizing the scope of internal judicial
independence. Given this context, it is significant to note that there are
conflicting views on the definition of the scope of internal judicial independence
vis-A-vis the superior courts. These conflicting views are reflected in the
doctrinal approach to precedent. Civil law countries such as Germany perceive
the concept of substantive internal judicial independence to extend to judges'
independence vis- -vis superior court decisions. With some exceptions, judges
are free to disregard precedent. In common law countries, judges are bound by
previous decisions of superior courts and sometimes by those of the same court.
The doctrine of binding precedent exists in different legal systems in varying
degrees.
With regard to administrative judicial independence, it is generally accepted
that judges cannot claim independence from required and necessary guidance
and supervision in "administrative" aspects of adjudication. The US Supreme
Court accepts this position that judges should be subject to administrative
supervision, and the Mt. Scopus Standards also refers to this issue of internal
judicial independence. 3
51 See Shimon Shetreet, Models of Constitutional Adjudication: A Comparative Analysis, in Ada
Pelegrini Grinovner and Petronio Calmon, eds, Papers Presented at the XII Congress of Procedural Law
769-98 (Forensa 2007). See also Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence on the Scope of Internal
Independence, in Judicial Independence Today 345-57 (Giuffre 1999).
52 Consider Mauro Cappeletti, Who Watches the Watchmen?: A Comparative Study on Judicial
Resoonsibil_, 31 AmJ Comp L 1, 7-9 (1983) (accepting the proposition only in part).
53 See Chandler v Judicial Conference, 398 US 74 (1970). See also Mt. Scopus Standards, § 9 (cited in note
4).
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B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
1. Constitutional versus Legislative Protection
In the normative analysis of the regulation of judicial issues, it must be
recognized that certain matters should be regulated in the constitution whereas
others may be regulated by ordinary legislation. When a matter is regulated in
ordinary legislation, the legislature can create an amendment through simple
majority. In contrast, protection granted by the constitution is modifiable only
by constitutional amendment. Therefore, in order to better guard judicial
independence, issues such as the terms of office for judges should be protected
in constitutional provisions.5 4 For example, the composition of the Supreme
Court of the United States-how many judges sit in the court-is not
constitutionally regulated and therefore the number of sitting judges has been
changed by legislation.5 During the controversy over New Deal legislation, US
President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to pack the court-increasing the
number of judges-which he could do by ordinary legislation. 6
In addition to general constitutional protections of judicial independence, a
more detailed constitutional protection should include six fundamental
substantive principles. Conceptually, these principles are imperative prerequisites
to an independent judicial system." They will be discussed in the following
subsection.
54 See Shetreet, Judidal Independence at 590 (cited in note 7). Consider Canada Const, § 96-101,
which provide for the appointment, terms of office, and remuneration of judges.
55 The Judiciary Act of 1789 initially sets the number of Supreme Court judges to six. In 1807,
Congress increased the number of judges to seven because the number of judicial circuits had
increased (each Supreme Court judge represents one judicial circuit). In 1837 Congress increased
the number of judges to nine, and in 1863, to ten, for the same reason as in 1807. The Judicial
Circuits Act of 1866 provided that the next three judges to retire were not to be replaced,
reducing the number of Supreme Court judges to seven. This number increased to nine with the
Circuit Judges Act of 1869, the current number of judges. In 1937, President Roosevelt tried to
"pack the court" with up to fifteen judges in order to ensure passage of his "New Deal"
legislation, by way of the Judiciary Reorganization Bill. However, Congress failed to pass the
legislation, so the number of Supreme Court judges remained at nine.
56 See, for example, United States v Will, 449 US 200 (1980); Chandler, 398 US 74; Jamie L. Carson and
Benjamin A. Kleinerman, A Switch in Time Saves Nine: Institutions, Strategic Actors, and FDR's Court-
Packing Plan, 113 Pub Choice 301 (2002); Michael Nelson, The President and the Court: Reinterpreting
the Court-Packing Episode of 1937, 103 Pol Sci Q 267 (1988); Gregory A. Caldeira, Public Opinion and
The US Supreme Court: FDR's Court-Packing Plan, 81 Am Pol Sci Rev 1139 (1987).
57 Shetreet, Judcal Independence at 592, 615 (cited in note 7).
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2. The Six Principles of Constitutional Protection
The first principle of constitutional protection of judicial independence is a
rule against ad hoc tribunals. The second is a prohibition against intentionally
stripping courts of their jurisdiction and diverting cases to other tribunals with a
view to having those cases disposed of by tribunals that do not enjoy the same
conditions of independence as the original courts. The third is the standard-
judge principle, or the ordinary-judge principle, which requires that judges be
selected to hear cases by a predetermined internal plan or assignment schedule
prior to the commencement of the case. The fourth principle requires post-
decisional independence of the judgment and its respect by the other branches
of the government. The fifth principle is that judges must not be part of the
administrative arm of the executive branch; rather, they should be viewed as
independent constitutional or statutory officers of the state, completely separate
from the civil service. The sixth principle is that changes in the terms of judicial
office should not be applied to present judges unless such changes serve to
improve the terms of judicial service.
a) The first princple: barring ad hoc tribunals. The first principle-excluding
ad hoc or special tribunals-is widely accepted and implemented. There are a
number of countries that guarantee trial by ordinary courts, precluding the need
for a separate clause prohibiting special courts.58 Some countries prohibit ad hoc
tribunals and guarantee trial by an ordinary court.59 Other countries only prohibit
special courts.6° International standards generally mention both rights.6'
Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights ("American
Convention") attained this goal by providing for the right to be tried before a
"competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by
law."' 62 This language clearly excludes an ad hoc tribunal, though an exception is
made for the establishment of a military court under separate jurisdictional
58 These countries include Ghana, Greece (Greece Const, art 8), Finland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Uganda, Uruguay, the US (US Const, amend V, VIII), and Belgium
(Belgium Const, art 94). Section 83(2) of Austria's Constitution establishes the right for an
ordinary judge. Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 8 of the American Convention also declare
such a right (cited in note 2).
59 Ghana, Greece, and Sweden prohibit the establishment of a court for an act already committed or
for a special purpose. See generally Amos J. Peaslee and Dorothy P. Xydis, Constitutions of Naions
(Nijhoff rev 3d ed 1965-70). For a country study of judiciaries, see generally Shetreet, Judidal
Independence (cited in note 7).
60 Brazil, Japan, and Portugal are among such countries. See generally Peaslee and Xydis (cited in
note 59).
61 See IBA Standards, art 21 (cited in note 6); The Universal Declaration on the Independence of Jusice, art
2.06 (allowing emergency regulations as well as the standard rule) (cited in note 8).
62 American Convention (cited in note 2).
Summer 2009
Shetreet
Chicago Journal of International Law
arrangements.63 In line with the American Convention, precious few countries
allow special courts. Those that do permit special tribunals generally limit their
use. Although a limitation rather than outright prohibition does not fit under
the stricter conditions delineated by the American Convention, it does
emphasize that even the most open-armed system is reticent to fully embrace the
concept of ad hoc tribunals.
This strict limitation by most countries does not generally exclude the
possibility of establishing courts by means of legislation in order to deal with a
specialized branch of law. The litmus test that distinguishes a specialized court
from a "forbidden" special court is that the scope of a specialized court is
defined widely in terms of a field of law, and not by a given crime or a specific
occurrence. In contrast to a permissible specialized court, a "forbidden" special
court acts as a severe limitation on judicial independence by giving the executive
the possibility to prosecute people before a special tribunal on the executive's
own terms, thus bypassing the protections afforded to defendants in the
ordinary court system.
b) The second princjple: the prohibition of diversion of cases from the ordinary courts.
The second of these principles prohibits the intentional stripping of a court's
jurisdiction and diverting cases to other tribunals with a view toward having
those cases disposed by tribunals that do not enjoy the same conditions of
independence as the original courts. This is sometimes referred to as the non-
diverting principle. Ordinarily, this second constitutional principle applies to
criminal cases. One illustration of this principle concerns a German ordinance,
in force from 1931 to 1976, which authorized the fiscal authorities to investigate
cases of suspected criminal violations of the tax law.
6
' The fiscal authorities 66
were also authorized to punish less severe offenses, mainly by imposing fines,
without providing recourse to the regular criminal procedure. Two different
procedures were possible, with Section 445 of the ordinance governing cases in
63 Italy, Netherlands, the United States (US Const, amend V), and Austria (during wartime) allow for
similar exceptions. See generally Peaslee and Xydis (cited in note 59).
64 Malta and Norway are among such countries (guaranteeing trial before an ordinary court,
although special courts can be established). See id. Right to appeal is reserved, however, for
ordinary courts. The Indian Constitution provides that although the Supreme Court has general
jurisdiction with regard to appeals from Indian courts and tribunals, this jurisdiction does not
apply to "any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces."
India Const, § 136.
65 Abgabenverordnung vom 13, December 1919 (RGBL S 1993) IBA der Bekanntmachung vom 22
Mai 1931 (RGBL IS 161). This was superceded by the Abgabenordnung (AO 1977) vom 16
Maerz 1976 (BGBI L S 613) of § 96 of the Einfunrungsgesetz zur Abgabenordnung (EGAO
1977) vom 14 December 1976 (BGBI I S 3341).
66 Id, §§ 421(2), 445, 447(1).
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which the accused confessed guilt, and Section 442 governing all other cases."
The fine imposed in either case was considered a criminal sentence; the
"Notification of Penalty" was open to administrative appeal and to regular
criminal appeals courts.6
The constitutionality of this criminal jurisdiction of the fiscal authorities
was considered doubtful due to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany, which came into force in 1949.69 In 1967, the federal constitutional
court ruled that these sections of the ordinance were unconstitutional.7' The
court held that Section 101(1) of the Basic Law guarantees everyone the right
not to be removed from the jurisdiction of his or her lawful judge. Accordingly,
an authority vested by the constitution in judges may not by law be vested in the
administrative branch of government-in this case the fiscal authorities. The
court also held that Section 92(1) of the Basic Law vests the authority of
imposing criminal sentences with judges. Judicial power is exclusively vested in
judges and must be interpreted in its material sense, that is, as one branch of
government according to the theory of the separation of powers.
c) The thirdprindple: the predetermined plan. The third principle requires that
cases be heard by judges according to an internally predetermined plan or
schedule prior to a case's commencement. To schedule cases otherwise raises
the possibility that a judge will be assigned a particular case in order to increase
the likelihood of a certain ruling.7' In civil law countries this practice is not
acceptable. In Germany this principle of a pre-determined plan is defined as the
right to a lawful judge. It is a matter of doctrine and not of practical regulation.
In Russia there has been a practice of consciously and purposefully selecting
judges in order to reach certain outcomes. The Council of Europe noted the
following about this practice:
There is a widespread practice that the Chairman of a court or the heads of
kollegiias or divisions within the courts, assign the cases to the judges as
they like and without regulations for predictable criteria. We heard a
Chairman judge say, "After having read a new case I'll know to which judge
67 Consider Bundesverfassungsgericht 22, 49, 54-57 ("BverfGE").
68 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art 19, § 4 (containing official English translation
of the Grundgesetz).
69 Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 29 Mai 1949 (BGBI S 1).
70 BverfGE 22, 49. However, if these offenses were decriminalized, such administrative authorities
may be unconstitutional.
71 On case scheduling, see generally Maureen Solomon and Douglas Somerlot, Caseflow Management
in the Trial Court: Now and for the Future (American Bar Assoc 1987); James S. Kakalik, et al, Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive?: An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act
(Rand 1996).
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I'll give it." It is not necessary for us to underline that this practice
undermines the appearance of individual independence of judges.72
d) The fourth prindple: postjudidal indpendence of judgments. The fourth
principle is post-judicial independence of the judgment and its respect by the
other branches of the government. Frustrating the execution of a judgment has
the same net effect as preventing a citizen from appearing before the courts in
the first place.73 Similar to frustrating judgments is the requirement that the
power of pardon be used sparingly,74 as the granting of pardons also can
frustrate the just execution of judgments.
Tied in with this fourth principle is the ban against passing legislation
reversing a specific judgment, a practice that has unfortunately been witnessed.75
Another sub-issue is the prohibition against passing laws with the intent of
preventing the courts from completing a hearing, or ensuring that a case does
not arrive before the courts at all. An example of this occurred in India, in the
Gandhi Election Case, when the Indian government passed a series of
constitutional amendments in an attempt to prevent a Supreme Court of India
from deciding on the validity of the current election.76
e) The fifth principle: separating between judges and civil servants. The fifth
principle is that judges must not be part of the administrative arm of the
executive branch of the government; rather, they should be viewed as
independent constitutional or statutory officers of the state, completely removed
from the civil service. This helps keep judges independent, helps prevent them
from having, or being perceived as having, a conflict of interest in the cases that
they hear, and, in turn, helps prevent judicial disqualifications.
Special consideration needs to be taken into account with regard to civil
jurisdiction career judiciaries, for in some of these countries the positions of
judge and public prosecutor are interchangeable. In addition, certain other of the
civil law countries group judicial salaries along with those of civil servants.77
J) The sixth principle: changes should not affect serving judges. The sixth principle
is that changes in the terms of judicial office should not be applied to presently
sitting judges unless such changes serve to improve the terms of judicial
72 Willi Fuhrmann and William Bowring, Diagnostic View ofthe Court System in Russia 5 (International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2002).
73 Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 609 (cited in note 7).
74 Id at 620.
75 Id at 609. An example is the War Damage Act 1965, c 18 (1965) (UK).
76 Sudipta Kaviraj, Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics, Econ and Pol Weekly 38 (Sept 20-27, 1986).
77 Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 623 (cited in note 7).
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service.7 Changes include reducing judicial salaries both directly and indirectly
(such as through altering pension plan contribution amounts), as well as
adjusting the retirement age for judges. The Supreme Court of Canada has held
that an exception to this rule exists when a reduction in, or freezing of, a
previously approved salary increase is made as a general economic austerity
79
measure.
Whenever changes in the term of office are introduced, a grandfather
clause should be included providing that the changes will not apply to serving
judges, such as in the Judicial Pensions Act in the United Kingdom. The act
introduced a retirement age of seventy-five for judges, but expressly provided
that it did not apply to serving judges.8"
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE CHALLENGED
A. PATTERNS OF INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Even once achieved, the continuation of judicial independence is not a
matter of course. It is constantly subject to challenges, sometimes by other
branches of government, and at other times as the result of internal
developments, changing political circumstances, or social and economic
pressures. Violations of accepted principles of judicial independence have
occurred in countries that represent all forms of government and all geographic
regions in the world. Challenges to judicial independence include interference
with personal independence through legislation, including legislation abolishing
security of tenure, lowering the retirement age, or abolishing certain courts so as
to effectively end the service of a judge.8"
78 Id. See also Jonathan L. Entin and Erik M. Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, andJudicial Inde endence:
Hatter v United States, 90 Tax Notes 1541, 1543 (2001).
79 See, for example, Beauregard v The.Queen, [1981] 130 DLR 3d 433 (Canada).
80 Judicial Pensions Act 1959, ch 9 (1959) (UK), available online at
<http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=AU+Legislation&searchEnacted=0exten
tMatchOnly=0&confersPower=O&blanketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&PageNumber=0&Nav
From=0&parentActiveTextDocld=1 128286&ActiveTextDocld= 1128286&filesize=20043>
(visited Apr 23, 2009).
81 Mark Tushnet, Leadership in Constitutional Courts, Conference Materials, Krakow (Mar 2008). See
also Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 607-08 (cited in note 7).
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B. COUNTRY ILLUSTRATIONS OF DISMISSAL OF JUDGES:
ECUADOR, PAKISTAN, AND OTHERS
Ecuador provides a salient example of infringements on judicial
independence through the removal of judges. On April 24, 2007, all nine judges
of Ecuador's Constitutional Court were removed following an unpopular ruling.
The removal was executed by a congressional vote lacking any legal basis.
According to Ecuadorian law, the Constitutional Court's judges are removable
only by impeachment. Still, this was the third time in three years that judges were
removed by Congress. This act demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the
independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, a month prior to the firing, the
President of the Supreme Electoral Court was removed by Ecuador's legislature
one day after the Court handed down an unpopular decision. 82
The situation in Ecuador is reminiscent of that in Uruguay in the early
1970s. In 1973, after the dissolution of the houses of parliament and the
establishment of a new system of government by the Constitutional Reform Act,
judicial independence was abolished. A special statute 3 passed by the "civil-
military" government abolished tenure for judicial offices and transferred all
powers of judicial administration to the executive. A new statute84 enacted in
November 1981 introduced reforms providing for some participation of the
judiciary in conducting the affairs of the judges, but the executive's control over
the judiciary remained substantial.85
Fortunately, political efforts to interfere with judicial independence by
seeking the removal of judges do not always succeed, as exemplified by the
Czech Republic.86 The Czech president attempted to remove the Chief Justice of
the Czech Supreme Court from her position, but the Court upheld the principle
of judicial independence by ruling this attempt invalid.
C. REDUCING JUDICIAL SALARIES AND SUSPENDING COURTS
Violations also take the form of reducing salaries of judicial officers, as
previously took place in Portugal. It should be noted that reductions in, or the
freezing of, previously approved judicial salary increases, as general economic
austerity measures, are constitutionally acceptable. However, they have created
82 Human Rights Watch, Ecuador Removal of Judges Undermines Juadal Independence (May 10, 2007),
available online at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/05/l0/ecuador-removal-judges-
undermines-judicial-independence> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
83 Institutional Law No 8 (Ecuador).
84 Institutional Law No 12 (Ecuador).
85 See Shetreet, Juadcial Independence at 590 (cited in note 7).
86 Tushnet, Leadership in Constitutional Courts (cited in note 81).
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controversy in a number of countries, including in the United Kingdom in the
1930s,87 in the United States in the 1970s,88 and in Canada.89 Challenges to
judicial independence sometimes take the form of transferring judges to other
locations, which can be tantamount to removal when the transfer is effected in
order to rid a court of, or to punish, a particular judge.9° In Poland, a judge may
be relocated only with that judge's prior consent, or else through a disciplinary
court decision and based on grounds specified in the Structure of Common
Courts Act.9
Sometimes, the violation of judicial independence is effected by closing
down courts, as in Malta in 1981.92 Alternatively, attacks on judicial
independence sometimes come in the form of frustrating the execution of
judicial decisions or preempting judicial decisions, through suspending court
operations, legislating preempting adjudication, or reversing judicial decisions.93
D. INFRINGEMENTS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN RUSSIA
AND POLAND
Russia provides a salient example of a system that has challenged the
concept of judicial independence. The greatest challenge to Russian judicial
independence is the close relationship between the executive branch and the
87 For the statute that caused the controversy, see An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown,
and Better Securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, 12 & 13 Will 3, ch 2, 10 Statutes at
Large 357, 357-360 (1700) ("Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown") ("[Be it enacted that]
judges[] commissions be made quamdiu se bene gefferint, and their salaries ascertained and
established . . .
88 See, for example, Will, 449 US 200.
89 See, for example, Beauregard, 130 DLR 3d 433. Similar controversy arose in Israel in 1985 when
salaries and prices were frozen and the emergency regulations included the judges under public
servants whose salaries were frozen. The judges challenged this approach, arguing that they were
not to be included. Israel's Basic Law resolves this issue by providing that judicial salaries cannot
be singled out for reduction but may be reduced with other sectors of the public service. See
Basic Laws of Israel: The Judiciary § 10, available online at
<http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic8_eng.htm> (visited Apr 23, 2009). See also
Shimon Shetreet, Justice in Israel. A Study of the Israeli Judiday (Martinus Nijhoff 1994).
90 See Jill Cottrell, The Indian Judges' Transfer Case, 33 Int & Comp L Q 1032 (1984).
91 Ustawa Prawo o Ustroju Sadow Powsechnych, Journal of Laws (uly 27, 2001) (referred to in Pawel
Pietkiewicz and Lukasz Hejmej, The Polish Judidal System and Legal Procedure, in Zdzislow Brodecki,
ed, Polish Business Law 43 (Kluwer Law International 2003)).
92 Shetreet, Judicialndependence at 602 (cited in note 7).
93 Id at 610.
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judiciary,94 resulting in a lack of sufficient judicial independence. This challenge
can be seen by subjective case assignments and reassignments, and the pressures
exerted on judges by both the executive branch and by higher ranking judges.9"
This challenge to judicial independence is seen in informal judicial
supervision, primarily of lower court judges. One form of "supervision" is
manifested in the ability of higher level judges and prosecutors to insist on
reviews of lower court judgments. These forced reviews mean that lower court
decisions can be vacated, at any time. Supervision is also seen through the
"advice" and "hints" provided by higher court judges to their lower court
counterparts. Lower court judges often seek and welcome these suggestions on
account of Russia's system of judicial promotions. Judicial promotions are
largely based on judicial records of overturned judgments, thus providing an
impetus to judges to ensure that their decisions are congruous with higher court
sentiments. Finally, judges are appointed supervisor judges who officially review
supervisees' decisions and serve in the role of "mentors."96
The case of Kudeshkina v Russia, pending before the ECtHR, illustrates
systemic challenges of Russian judicial independence. In Kudeshkina, former
Judge Kudeshkina placed a complaint before the ECtHR.97 The background to
the complaint illustrates a system in which undue pressure is put on judges:
while sitting on a 2003 criminal case, both the public prosecutor and the chief
judge pressured Kudeshkina. The significance of Kudeshkina is due to the
applicant-not a layperson but a former judge with close to two decades of
experience.
Ms. Kudeshkina testified that
IT1he public prosecutor who was representing the Prosecutor General's
Office clearly decided that this questioning was not favourable to the
prosecution and therefore did everything possible to disrupt the hearing.
For no reason he challenged me as a judge, the lay assessors and the whole
94 Jackson Diehl, In Russia 'Legal Nihilism as Usual', Wash Post A17 (July 28, 2008); Peter H.
Solomon and Todd S. Fogelsong, Courts and Transition in Russia: The Challenge ofJudidal Reform 47-
49 (Westview 2000).
95 Fuhrmann and Bowring, Diagnostic View of the Court System in Russia at 5 (cited in note 72).
96 Solomon and Fogelsong, Courts and Transition in Russia at 50-52 n 66 (cited in note 94); Gerard P.
van den Berg, Recourse Against Judgments in Civil and Criminal Cases in Russia, in Ferdinand
Feldbrugge, Roger Clark and Stanislaw Pomorski, eds, International and National Law in Russian and
Eastern Europe 42-43 (Martinus Nijhoff 2001).
97 Kudeshkina v Russia, App No 29492/05 Eur Ct HR (2005), available online at
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=847800&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01Cl 166DEA398649>
(visited May 31, 2009).
VoL 10 No. 1
The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law
composition of the court. His motions were made in a manner that was
humiliating, offensive and insulting to the court, and were clearly untrue.98
Ms. Kudeshkina testified that the procurator laid several challenges against the
assessors and herself, and that all parties save for the procurator objected to
these challenges. She further testified that as a result of the challenges the lay
assessors withdrew from the case. One of the assessors explained to the former
judge that the withdrawal was due to the pressure being placed by the agent of
the Prosecutor General's office.
According to Ms. Kudeshkina, the chief judge also put pressure on her
during that case, resulting in her complaint to the High Judiciary Qualification
Panel in December 2003. Ms. Kudeshkina in her complaint stated that the chief
judge
demanded that I give an account on the merits of this case while its
examination was underway, and that I inform her about the decisions the
court was about to take; she even called me out of the deliberations room
for that purpose. [She] insisted on removing certain documents from the
case file, forced me to forge the minutes of the hearing, and also
recommended that I ask the lay assessors not to turn up for the hearing.
Following my refusal to bow to this unlawful pressure [she] removed me
from the proceedings and transferred the case to another judge. 99
Another example of infringement on judicial independence in Russia can
be seen in the Zorkin-Yeltsin affair. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
constitutional court was led by Chief Justice Valery Zorkin in several cases
involving the transition of rule from the Soviet to the post-Soviet era. These
cases were controversial, and included both an invalidation of one of President
Yeltsin's decrees and a finding that Yeltsin's actions were unconstitutional. In
response to these and other decisions, Yeltsin shut down the constutional court
for several years. When it reopened, Valery Zorkin remained with the court.
However, the court's perspective was notably different after its reopening: it
began to regularly agree with government actions.
00
Poland has seen a struggle between the executive and the judiciary over the
proper demarcation lines between the two branches, as outlined in the detailed
reports of a high level committee of the IBA. The reports outline a series of
measures introduced by the Polish government which, when considered
collectively, appeared to have been designed with the intention of ensuring that
the judiciary follow the will of the executive branch. These measures included
the appointment of trainee judges for trial periods and increased authority by the
98 Id.
99 id.
100 Mark Tushnet, Leadershio in Constitutional Courts (cited in note 81).
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Minister of Justice over the judiciary, including the Minister's power to transfer
judges against their wills and to order immediate suspensions in certain
situations. In addition, the Minister of Justice was given the ability to appoint
presidents of courts upon only the opinion of the General Assembly of Judges,
as well as the power to appoint temporary presidents for consecutive terms.
Following, and perhaps on account of, the IBA's November 2007 report of
these issues, the Polish government retracted many but not all of its practices. In
September 2008, the IBA published a follow-up report which expressed
satisfaction that many of the changes had been reversed, but restated concerns
that some measures, including the Minister of Justice's power to transfer judges,
remained.''
VI. THE CREATION OF THE LEGAL CULTURE OF
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The legal culture of judicial independence is created through the inter-
melding and interrelationship of domestic and international law. Contributing
factors include domestic constitutional and legislative protections of judicial
independence, the effect of international jurisprudence on national laws, and the
emergence of professional international standards on judicial independence.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS OF DOMESTIC LAW TO THE CREATION OF
THE LEGAL CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Domestic law plays a significant role in shaping judicial independence.
English and American law illustrate how domestic law can shape the
development of an international culture of judicial independence. The main
impact on the developments leading to the establishment of national laws
protecting judicial independence took place towards the end of the seventeenth
century and the beginning of the eighteenth century in England. Later it was
developed in the United States, as evidenced in the US Constitution.
101 See generally International Bar Association, Justice under Siege: a Report on the Rule of Law in Poland
(Nov 2007), available online at <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd
=
3 &url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ccbe.orgO/o2Ffileadmin%2Fuser.upload%2FNTCdocument0/02
Fl1 _2007_Nov06_Reportlj i94344860.pdf&ei=fB6oSZbtZC-nQfB0unmDw&usg=AFQ
jCNGfvL8q7QgAJ7w6m5LwawLDKCQnBw&sig2=FwResMUuEdN8uLaeKbl-vg> (visited Apr
23, 2009); International Bar Association, Follow Up Report to Justice under Siege: a Report on the Rule of
Law in Poland (Sept 2008), available online at <http://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DF75F80F-A773-410C-A6A8-661 F6612DOCC>
(visited Apr 23, 2009).
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1. The English Experience
The English experience highlights the crisis that a society must often go
through in order to attain the goal of securing an independent judiciary. °2 For
centuries, sovereignty was concentrated in the king, who was an absolute
monarch and thus the source of all governmental and political power. The king
may have established courts, but these courts existed only for the purpose of
exercising and carrying out the king's powers and responsibilities. Judges were an
integral part of the royal administration, and thus to an observer, "the distinction
between judicial and administrative duties would have been rather obscure."'0 3
This seemingly impossible beginning for the judiciary was not, however, one
which gave rise to much concern. At that period, the judges undoubtedly were
not independent, being under strict royal control. The king enjoyed the
cooperation of the judiciary. This collaboration was harmonious and widely
accepted, due to the fact that the sovereign did not seek to use judges as
instruments in political struggles.
10 4
Thus, the political makeup of England was not endangered until change
came about as a result of a clash between the king and Parliament in the
seventeenth century. Both sides demanded the backing of the courts, which
were responsible for giving legal interpretation to the meaning of royal
prerogative and parliamentary privilege.
The king had the upper hand due to his control over the judiciary,
including the power of dismissal from office, suspension, and transfer from one
judicial office to another. It was due not only to the countervailing power of
Parliament, but also to a number of strong-willed judges, that the judiciary
eventually secured its independence along the lines it follows in England today.
Parliament's own efforts to control the judiciary were "in the main motivated by
political considerations. Judicial activities were labeled 'illegal,' 'contrary to
fundamental laws' or 'corrupt,' but in effect the judges were proceeded against
by Parliament to protect the political interests at stake and to curb royal
powers. ' ' 10s Judges could be impeached or called before Parliament to explain
their actions as if their only duty was to serve Parliament.
102 For a detailed analysis, see Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Pokical Anaysis 65 et seq
(Chicago 1981).
103 Shetreet, Judges on Trialat 2 (cited in note 1).
104 Id. See also Sir William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law 347 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed
1937).
105 Shetreet, Judges on Trial at 7 (cited in note 1). See generally Alfred F. Havighurst, The Judiciary and
PoZiics in the Reign of Charles II, 66 L Q Rev 229 (1950); W.J. Jones, Polics and the Bench: The Judges
and the Origins ofthe Engish Civil War 18-19, 21-22, 51-52 (George Allen & Unwin 1971).
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This conflict of power was expressed in the crucial debate between Sir
Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and later of the
King's Bench, and Sir Francis Bacon. Bacon's view was that the judge's function
was not merely to declare the law, but also to support the government. Coke, in
a series of cases culminating in direct confrontation with James I over the Case
on Commendams,'°6 steadfastly maintained that the judge must preserve his
impartiality in all matters, and was under no duty to consult the king even when
decisions affected the powers of the Crown) °7 Coke's view has prevailed,
although it requires some interpretation to bring it in line with modern practice.
His advocacy of the courts' exercise of control over a "repugnant" act of
parliament has been seen as a call for narrow interpretation of statutes purported
to offend fundamental laws, rather than for the invalidation of such statutes by
judicial review. 108
Parliament battled with the Crown on the issue of control of the judiciary
by exerting sanctions of its own, and the seventeenth century saw a number of
celebrated impeachments. 1°9 A second line of attack was to enact legislation
aimed at the elimination of royal interference with the judicial process. Measures
adopted included a judicial oath not to receive fees or presents from a party to a
case except from the king, who paid judges' salaries, nor to heed any direction
from the king on an issue pending before the court.
Security of tenure was the central issue, however, and it was not until the
Act of Settlement in 1701 that an important measure of security was finally
guaranteed." 0 Prior to the act, judges had ordinarily been appointed by the
monarchs "during pleasure," and thus had been subject to the royal whim. The
Act of Settlement provided for judges to be appointed during good behavior
(quam diu se bene gesserin) and for their salaries to be "ascertained and established,
but upon the address of both Houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove
them." However, judicial tenure was still not yet completely secured; judicial
appointments terminated on the death of the monarch or six months thereafter.
An amendment in Queen Anne's reign not only did not guarantee security after
the six-month period, but also was worded so as to cast doubt on the six month
106 Colt and ClovervBisbop of Coventry, [1617] Hob 140 (UK).
107 Shetreet, Judges on Trial at 6 (cited in note 1).
108 Idat 6-7.
109 The Commons impeached Lord Chief Justice Scroggs in 1680 and though fellow lords refused to
impeach him, he was removed from the bench. See 2 Pad Deb 1, 22-25 (1680-1692). See also
Shetreet, Judges on Trial at 7 (cited in note 1).
10 Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown, 12 & 13, Will 3, ch 2, 10 Statutes at Large at 360
(cited in note 87).
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period's applicability to judges at all. It took the initiative of George III in 1760
to help secure the term of judicial office beyond the lifetime of the monarch.
The current formula has evolved from the consolidation of the Act of
Settlement and the said 1760 Act. According to both constitutional statutes
neither king nor parliament would be capable of attaining their particular
political objectives or ambitions by exercising control over the decisions of the
judiciary. The king could no longer hold over every judge's head the threat of
immediate dismissal from an office held at his pleasure, nor could Parliament
attain its own ends by an equally preemptory and almost as effective withdrawal
of livelihood."' Subsequently, Section 12(1) of the Supreme Court of Judicature
(Consolidation) Act of 1925, which is the modern formulation of the historical
development, stated: "All the judges of the High Court and of the Court of
Appeal, with the exception of the Lord Chancellor, shall hold their offices
during good behavior, subject to a power of removal by His Majesty on an
address to His Majesty by both Houses of Parliament.'12
However, the situation in 1760 was in need of further change. The reliance
of the system on litigants' fees for judicial remuneration left the system open to
abuse and misconduct. George III's reign saw the establishment of salaries and
pensions. However, it was only in the last century that the salary became
substantial, and a prohibition against supplementing it was added. In this way,
"[t]he additional sources of income were eliminated in a very long gradual
evolution extending over three centuries.""' 3 Association between the judiciary
and the other branches of the government, the executive and the parliament,
was not eliminated altogether. The last aspect of judicial association with the
executive was gradually extinguished when judges stopped taking high
government appointments. This practice ceased only after Chief Justice
Ellenborough's appointment caused public criticism in 1805. Although
Ellenborough retained his cabinet seat while he sat on the bench, such
appointments were not repeated.'14 It was partly under the influence of such
incidents that the respective constitutional roles of the executive and judiciary
were crystallized. In addition, no common law judge has sat in the House of
Commons since 1803 and no superior judge has done so since the passage of the
1873 and 1875 Judicature Acts."'
11 Beauregard, 130 DLR 3d 433.
112 15 & 16 Geo 5, ch 49 (1925) (Eng).
113 Shetreet, Judges on Trialat 11 (cited in note 1).
114 Id at 14-15.
115 Idat 13-15.
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An important development affecting judicial independence was the
fundamental reform of the Courts Act of 1971,116 introduced on the
recommendations of the Beeching Commission Report."' The Courts Act
eliminated centuries of local control over courts, established a new class of
judges, called circuit judges, set up an administrative hierarchy across the
country, and made court personnel a part of the national civil service. The Act,
which restructured the criminal court system in England, has been described as a
"radical, even a spectacular reform.""' This reform, however, carried with it
mixed blessings for the independence of the judiciary in England. While it
promoted judicial independence by considerably reducing the dependence of the
criminal justice system on part-time judges, the centralization of judicial
administration in England brought increased executive control and thus
endangered judicial independence." 9 This was to be resolved only three decades
later in the Constitutional Reform Act, which will be discussed later. 2 °
2. The American Experience
The American perspective on judicial independence differed from that of
the English. The American Founding Fathers adhered to a much stricter
doctrine of separation of powers in the US Constitution. The Founding Fathers
adopted the doctrine of checks and balances based on the concept that no
function of one branch of government should be exercised by another branch
and that each branch should function as a check on any improper use of power
by the other branches.
In this context, the Founding Fathers wished to ensure judicial
independence. The Declaration of Independence charged George III with
making "Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries.' 2' Foundations of judicial
independence are laid out in Article III of the US Constitution, which states that
"[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a
116 Courts Act 1971, ch 23 (1971) (UK), available online at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1971/pdf/ukpga_19710023_en.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
117 Lord Beeching, Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions, 1966-1969, Cmnd 4153 (HMSO
1969).
118 Lord Hailsham, 312 HI Deb 1247 (Nov 19, 1970).
119 Lord Lane, Judicial Independence and the Increasing Executive Role in Judicial Administration, in Shetreet
and Deschenes, eds, Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate at 525-28 (cited in note 7).
120 See Section VI.D.
121 United States Declaration of Independence (1776).
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Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.'
122
An important development took place in the mid-nineteenth century. A
radical political movement called Jacksonian Democracy introduced the practice
of electing short-term judges. The practice is found in many state courts today
and is motivated by a desire to make judges more accountable to the people. The
federal judiciary escaped the onslaught of Jacksonian Democracy; its appointive
procedure of selection was not affected. This fact is largely due to the relative
unimportance of the federal trial courts at the time, as well as the difficulty of
amending the federal Constitution. However, it should be noted that during the
last three to four decades, countries have introduced appointive or mixed
appointive-elective models of judicial selection.
The federal judicial system was given a large degree of administrative
autonomy in 1939 with the creation of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, and the transfer of court administration from the Department of
Justice to the judiciary. The result was a largely centralized federal judicial
administration system, autonomous in the conduct of its administrative and
financial matters. Budget estimates submitted by the judiciary were not subject
to executive revision after this date. 23 In contrast, the state judiciary, which is
not uniform, does not always have the effective administrative control or
budgetary freedom of the federal courts. The problems of court financing have
led to numerous suits brought by trial courts against local governments that have
failed to provide the budget necessary for the courts. 124
B. THE SHIFTING DIRECTIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE EFFECT OF POST-WORLD
WAR II INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE ON
NATIONAL LAWS
After the Second World War, there was a shift in the direction of the
normative cycle. Previously, the main area of impact was from national
jurisprudence contributing to the creation of the culture and the establishment
of the principles of judicial independence. However, beginning in this post-war
period, the momentum moved to the international scene, with international
jurisprudence contributing to the creation of the culture and the establishment
122 US Const, art III.
123 Ernest C. Friesen, Edward C. Gallas, and Nesta M. Gaflas, Managing the Courts 87-88 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1971).
124 See, for example, Judges for Third Jud'dal Circuit v County of Wayne, 172 NW 2d 436 (Mich 1969);
Smith vMiller, 384 P2d 738 (Colo 1963).
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of the principles of judicial independence in national systems. Major
international and regional human rights treaties contained provisions aimed at
securing judicial independence in international tribunals and in the states party to
the conventions. 25 In addition to the treaties, international court cases provided
remedies to enforce the right to an independent and impartial tribunal when
such a right was violated by the state. These decisions, issued by the ECtHR, are
binding upon the member states of the ECtHR and thus influence the judicial
independence in domestic national laws.
An example of international jurisprudence influencing domestic laws is
Procola v Luxembourg,126 in which the plaintiffs complained before the ECtHR of
an infringement on their right to an independent and impartial tribunal under
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR.'27 The ground for the complaint was that
some of the members of the Judicial Committee of Luxembourg who ruled on
Procola's application for judicial review had previously given their opinion on
the lawfulness of the impugned provisions in their other role as members of the
Conseil d'Etat. Their interpretation was that Article 6 is applicable only when the
proceedings are decisive for a civil right.
In determining whether Article 6 was violated, the ECtHR ruled that in the
context of an institution such as Luxembourg's Conseil d'Etat, the mere fact that
certain persons performed both the advisory and the reviewing functions with
respect to the same decisions casts doubt on the institution's structural
impartiality. Procola had legitimate grounds for fearing that the members of the
Judicial Committee would feel bound by the opinion previously issued. That
doubt, however slight, was sufficient to vitiate the impartiality of the tribunal in
question, thereby breaching Article 6, paragraph 1.
Another example of international jurisprudence was the case of McGonnell v
United Kngdom,128 in which the applicant claimed that a bailiff, while presiding
over the Court of Appeal, was not impartial due to his executive and legislative
roles as a representative of the UK government. The ECtHR was asked to
consider whether any direct involvement in the passage of legislation or
executive rules is sufficient to cast doubt on the impartiality of a judge
subsequently called on to interpret the wording of the legislation or rules at
issue. The ECtHR found that despite the lack of any proof of actual bias, the
bailiff could only cast a vote in the event of deadlock. However, there was no
obligation on the bailiff to exercise his casting vote where that vote impinged on
125 For a list of such treaties, see note 2.
126 Procola, 326 Eur Ct HR.
127 ECHR, art 6, 1.
I' McConnell, 30 Eur Ct HR 289.
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his conscience. Moreover, the States of Deliberation in Guernsey, the legislature
of the island in which the bailiff participated, was the body that passed the
regulations at issue. It can thus be seen to have had a more direct involvement
with the legislature than had the advisory panel of the Conseil d'Etat in the case
of Procola with its regulations.
In the case of De Haan v The Netherlands,'29 the judge who presided over the
appeals tribunal was called upon to decide an objection for which he himself was
responsible. In that case, notwithstanding an absence of prejudice or bias on the
part of the judge, the court found that the applicant's fears regarding the judge's
participation were objectively justified. 3°
These rulings by the ECtHR, specifically Procola and McGonnell, cast doubt
on the legality of the traditional practice in England of the Lord Chancellor
presiding over appeals in the House of Lords, given that he is also a member of
the British cabinet. It is possible that, as in the cases of Prvcola and McGonnell, the
Lord Chancellor could be seen at that time as reviewing his own decisions made
as a member of the executive branch.131
In Findlay v United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated the conditions that a tribunal
has to meet in order to be considered independent:
The Court recalls that in order to establish whether a tribunal can be
considered as "independent," regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner
of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of
guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body
presents an appearance of independence.132
Based on these criteria, the court determined that court-martial proceedings
were not adequately independent.
1 33
Standards of impartiality have been applied rather strictly, and in terms
indicating that they reflect an international law standard of independence. In
GonZae.z del Rio v Peru, the Human Rights Committee stated, "The right to be
tried by an independent and impartial tribunal is an absolute right that may
suffer no exception.' ' 34 Likewise, the UN Special Rapporteur on the
129 De Haan v The Netherlands, 1997-IV Eur Ct HR 1392, 1393.
130 Id at 1392, 1393 50-51.
131 For a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence, see James Crawford, The Independence of the Judiagy in
International Law, paper delivered at the Conference on Judicial Independence in International
Law, Jerusalem (2007).
132 Finday, 24 Eur HR Rep 221.
133 Id. See also Coae v Belgium, 2000-VII Eur Ct HR 120.
134 United Nations, Views of the Human Rights Committee under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Pohtical R'ghts, UN Doc CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987
5.2 (1992).
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independence of the judiciary and lawyers was "of the opinion that the general
practice of providing independent and impartial justice is accepted by States as a
matter of law and constitutes, therefore, an international custom.' ' 35 In
Germany, the Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests stated, "It
is in the general principles of international public law that one must look for any
grounds for disqualification of international judges.' '136 Furthermore, a lack of
independence on the part of a tribunal may also violate other norms of
international law. Similarly, if an executive attempts to rearrange the
composition of the courts, it may amount to both a denial of justice and a
violation of the right to a trial before an independent tribunal. 37
In Prosecutor v Delalic (Cehbiq), appellants argued for Judge Odio Benito's
disqualification on the basis that her appointment to the position of Vice
President of Costa Rica called into question her impartiality as required by
international law.' 38 Prior to accepting the nomination as vice president, Judge
Benito wrote to the president of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") stating that, if elected, she would not assume any executive
functions until the completion of her judicial duties as a member of the trial
chamber in the Celebid case. 13' The appeals chamber rejected the appellants'
submission that Judge Benito had exercised any executive functions in Costa
Rica during the time she was also a judge of the ICTY. The appeals chamber
noted that "it is beyond question that the principles of judicial independence and
impartiality are of a fundamental nature which underpin international as well as
national law."' 4° The appeals chamber then expressed its position on the
application of the principle of separation of powers in factual situations:
The application of the principle of separation of powers to the factual
situation underlying this ground of appeal is nevertheless misconceived. The
doctrine applies principally to ensure the separate and independent exercise
of the different powers within the same sphere or political system. The
135 United Nations, Independence and Impartialiy of the Judiciay, Jurors and Assessors and the Indpendence of
Lawjers: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Param Cumaraswany, UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/39 35
(1995).
136 Bengston v Federal Republic of Germany, 28 ILR 549, 557 (Arbitral Commn on Property, Rights &
Interests 1959).
137 See, for example, Jan Paulsson, Denial ofJustice in InternationalLaw 163 (Cambridge 2005).
138 Prosecutor v Delalil, Case No IT-96-21-A (Oct 25, 1999) 1-3; Prosecutor v Delali, Case No IT-96-
21-A (Feb 20, 2001). The appellants also sought to argue that, following this appointment, Judge
Odio Benito failed to meet the requirements for the qualification of judges set out in Article 13 of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Statute. In particular, it was argued that her
appointment disqualified her from "appointment to the highest judicial offices" in Costa Rica.
Delali, 656 (Feb 20, 2001).
139 Id, 684.
14 Id, 689.
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purpose of requiring a separation of judicial from other powers is to avoid
any conflict of interest. Where the relevant powers arise in separate systems
or on different planes-such as the national and the international-the
potential for there to be any convergence in the subject matter of the
powers, and therefore for a conflict of interest to arise, is greatly reduced. 41
Not every association with a case will give rise to disqualifying a judge.
Thus the standards of impartiality do not entail the allowance of disqualification
of a judge on the basis of alleged partiality deriving from his or her previous
experience. In Prosecutor v Furundija, the appellant challenged his conviction on
the basis that the presiding judge, Judge Mumba, "should have been disqualified
as an appearance was created that she sat in judgment in a case that could
advance and in fact did advance a legal and political agenda which she had
helped to create whilst a member of the [UN Commission on the Status of
Women] ." 4 2 It was shown that prior to her election to the ICTY, Judge Mumba
had served as the Zambian representative to the UN Commission on the Status
of Women. Thus, it was suggested, among other things, that Judge Mumba
advocated the position that rape was a war crime and encouraged the vigorous
prosecution for war crimes of persons charged with rape. The appeals chamber
decided to dismiss this challenge on the basis that Judge Mumba acted as a
representative of her country and therefore in an official and not a private
capacity. 143 In addition, the appeals chamber ruled, after examining various
international precedents, that a judge should not be disqualified because of his or
her alleged partiality due to previous experience.'"
In Bengston v Federal Republic of Germany,'45 the Arbitral Commission on
Property Rights and Interests in Germany considered a challenge to one of its
members on the basis of apprehended prejudice. The appellants claimed that
one of the arbitrators should have been disqualified due to his close connections
with the German government, the defendant in the proceedings. Although the
141 Id, $ 690.
142 PmsecutorvFurund&/a, No IT-95-17/1-A, 169 (Jul 21, 2000).
143 Id, 199.
144 Id, 205 (Stating.
The Appeals Chamber does not consider that a Judge should be disqualified
because of qualifications he or she possesses which, by their very nature, play
an integral role in satisfying the eligibility requirements. Judge Mumba's
membership in the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women
("UNCSW") and, in general, her previous experience in this area would be
relevant to the requirement under Article 13(1) of the Statute for experience in
international law, including human rights law.... In other words, the
possession of experience in any of those areas by a Judge cannot, in the
absence of the clearest contrary evidence, constitute evidence of bias or
partiality.).
145 Bengston, 28 ILR 549 (Arbitral Commn on Property, Rights & Interests).
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provisions of the Commission's constituent instrument did not operate to
disqualify the member, the Commission examined whether there were any
general principles of international law that were applicable in the situation. After
examining various international precedents and the constituent instruments of
other international tribunals, the Commission concluded that there was no basis
in public international law for the disqualification of the challenged member.'46
By virtue of Article 46 of the ECtHR, 147 which provides that members
"undertake to abide by the final judgment of the [ECtHR] in any case to which
they are parties' '148 and that "[t]he final judgment of the Court shall be
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution,"'149 the rich and vast amount of judge-made jurisprudence in the
international courts based on treaties and soft law provides a very significant
source for national legal systems in the shaping of the concept of judicial
independence. In addition, Title I, Article 6 of the Consolidated Version of the
Treaty of the European Union, 50 which provides that "the Union shall respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law"'' further ensures the domestic application of the
ECHR to member states. Thus, the principles regarding judicial independence
have become part of the law of the EU.
In addition, major international and regional human rights treaties
containing provisions aimed at securing judicial independence in international
tribunals and in the states party to the conventions also transform international
law into domestic law through the domestic applicability of their principles.
These international and regional treaties include Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; Article 6 of the ECHR; Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, paragraph 1 of which
provides, "In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law"; Article 8 of the American Convention, paragraph 1 of which states, "Every
146 Id at 555 ("It considers [the concept of disqualification on the ground of apprehended prejudice]
to be unsuited to a transfer from the national to the international sphere of law when considering
the different, and much stricter, conceptions prevailing in a great many States.").
147 ECHR, art 46, 1.
148 Id.
149 Id, 2.
150 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 2002 OJ (C 325) 33 (Dec 24, 2002).
151 Id at 7-8.
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person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable
time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, previously established
by law"; Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which
states, "Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This
comprises:... (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial
court or tribunal"; and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, which states,
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union
are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in
compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone
shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal
aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 152
C. THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THEIR
NORMATIVE IMPACT
As international conventions and treaties and their surrounding
jurisprudence affected the legal culture of judicial independence, so too has there
been noticeable impact on the work of international scholars and professional
organizations on judicial independence, national courts, and jurisprudence.15 3
This impact has included the development of a series of important standards
related to judicial independence. International professional organizations such as
the IBA, the Law Asia Association, the UN Expert Group, and other NGOs
have issued statements or standards relative to judicial independence that have
become incorporated into the global judicial consciousness."'
The most recent of these, the Mt. Scopus Standards, were developed by the
International Project on the International Standards of Judicial Independence
after three years of work. As elaborated in the Introduction to this Article, the
152 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 OJ C 303 (Dec 14, 2007).
153 See generally Shetreet, Judges on Trial (cited in note 1); Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2), [1999] 1 ALL ER 577, 2 WLR 272 (UK); Valente, [1985] 2
SCR at 673; Regina vNolin, [1982] 17 ManR 2d 379 (UK).
154 IBA Standards (cited in note 6); Tokyo Principks on the Independence of the Judiciaay (cited in note 7);
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judidagy (cited in note 9); Council of Europe Statements on Judicial
Independence, particularly the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Independence, Effi iengy and Role of Judges, available online at
<www.venice.coe.int/site/main/texts/JD-docs/recR(94)12_E.pdf> (visited Apr 23, 2009);
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (Nov 2002), drafted by the Judicial Integrity Group and
endorsed by the member states of the UN Commission on Human Rights.
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Mt. Scopus Standards consolidated and revised a rich body of principles drawn
from the previous work and experiences of international, governmental, and
professional associations.
International standards, both individually and collectively, have an
important normative impact on judicial independence on several levels. First, as
subscribing states are under a legal or moral obligation to follow the precepts
and rules contained in, and derived from, the treaty or standards, standardized
international rules are applied in parallel domestic contexts. Not only do the
international standards or agreements surrounding them contain provisions
obligating adherence to their principles, but many states or regional
organizations also, on their own initiative, create internal obligations to respect
international principles. We have already seen this, in our discussion above of
Article 46 of the ECtHR. Another example of this, on a regional level, is The
Cairo Declaration on Judidal Independence, which in its preamble calls on its members
to "reaffirm commitments among the three branches of government to the basic
United Nations principles and standards of judicial independence adopted by the
General Assembly in 1985 and adopt measures to implement the principles [of]
judicial independence enshrined in the Beirut Declaration of 1999."'
Second, as both innovative and revised models are drawn from previous
concepts, the rules and principles of judicial independence are consolidated and
refined, and then domestically adopted. This principle was reviewed above, in
previous discussions regarding the Mt. Scopus Standards.
Third, as international standards often draw from positive cases regarding
judicial independence in individual states, standards that have been successfully
implemented in a domestic context or at the international level are crystallized
by way of international standards,156 and then transplanted into member state
systems. Illustrations of this third group are elaborated in the next section of this
Article, with the discussion of the principles of fair reflection and the democratic
accountability of the judiciary.
D. THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR REFLECTION
Two doctrines that relate to the composition of the court are the
exclusionary model, which demands the exclusion of a judge from a case due to
bias, and the inclusionary model, which requires that judges reflect society and,
in given situations, that judges of certain backgrounds sit on the bench.
Criticism of the narrow social, ideological, or geographical background of
judges has been recorded in numerous countries, including Canada, England,
155 ECHR, art 46, 1 (cited in note 2); Cairo Declaration on Judiial Independence (Feb 2003).
156 Alternately, domestic standards may be crystallized regionally through regional standards.
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France, Germany, and Greece. African countries are also sensitive to judicial
backgrounds, with regional, tribal, and cultural considerations imperative in
creating at least the appearance of impartiality and in thereby maintaining public
confidence in the courts.
The appointment process is important in assuring a balanced composition
of the judiciary ideologically, socially, and culturally. The principle of fair
reflection suggests that the judiciary is a branch of the government, not merely a
dispute-resolution institution, and therefore cannot be composed with total
disregard for the makeup of society. The principle is also concerned with
preserving public confidence in the courts, especially in appellate courts, and
particularly when cases are fraught with public or political issues.
The fair reflection principle is most commonly found in federal or
multicultural countries where a reflection of the constituent political units or
cultures is expected on the bench. Thus, the inclusionary model is illustrated by
the selection of international ad hoc judges. The inclusion of certain types of
judges is secured at times by express statutory provisions, and other times by
strictly followed conventions.
The principle of fair reflection also exists domestically, and comes in
response to the common criticism that the judiciary is predominantly composed
of the upper-middle class, or from a particular geographical or tribal area.
Canada offers an instructive example of the application of the fair
reflection principle. By statute, three of the nine justices of the Supreme Court
of Canada must come from Quebec, and by convention three are selected from
Ontario, two from the western provinces, and one from the Atlantic provinces.
Similarly, the House of Lords in Great Britain always has one judge from
Scotland and one from Northern Ireland. Other countries, such as Belgium,
Brazil, and Uganda, also pay special attention to the principle of fair reflection,
and select their judges from all geographical areas of the country.
Section 64 of the United Kingdom's Constitutional Reform Act provides
for fair reflection in the judiciary in its rules regarding judicial appointments.' It
provides that the Judicial Nomination Commission established by the act shall
aim at encouragement of diversity. It directs the commission to encourage
diversity in the range of persons available for selection for appointments. By
virtue of Section 63, the act qualifies this directive on diversity with the duty to
select judges based on merit and requires that persons of good character shall be
selected.
157 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, § 64 (cited in note 16).
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A reflective judiciary is necessary for maintaining public confidence in the
courts, 15 8 but the emphasis should be placed on striking a proper proportion.
Overemphasis should not be given to the impact of personal values on judicial
decisionmaking nor should the balancing effect of social controls, system
factors, and institutional controls be disregarded. Still, greater emphasis should
be given to the idea that adjudication involves some imposition of the judges'
own values, and thus the argument for a reflective judiciary. Compliance with
this principle of a reflective judiciary is subject to the requirements of
maintaining the professional quality and the moral integrity of the judiciary.
The concept of a reflective judiciary should also apply to the composition
of panels in particular cases. Panels should be either neutral or balanced. Judges
with strong convictions or past experiences that strongly identify them with one
side should refrain from sitting in cases where the public might question their
total neutrality.'59
After their appointment to the bench, judges are expected to be completely
independent and to express no overt bias toward the sector of society from
which the judge originates and reflects. This is unlike the representation in
Parliament where the elected member continues to view him or herself
legitimately as a representative of that member's constituency and community.
Also, whereas representation in the legislature is expected to be numerically
accurate ("one person one vote"), the reflection of society in the judiciary or in
supreme courts is intended to be fair rather than numerical. This difference is
due to an important distinction between legislative representation and judicial
reflection: whereas legislative representatives are elected in order to promote the
interests of their constituents, judges are bound to justice alone, and not to the
societal body of which they are reflective. The goal of judicial reflection is to
create confidence in the judiciary, not to forward any particular societal
interest.16
0
158 See Justice Dobbs, The Judge and the Defendant: Demographics and Diversioy in the COiminalJustice System,
New Developments in Criminal Justice Lecture at King's College London (Apr 24, 2008) ("By
being reflective of society, the courts are given legitimacy. Members of society are more likely to
respect and trust courts whose judges include people like themselves. It increases accountability
and thus public confidence.").
159 Section 2.15 of the Mt. Scopus Standards provides that the judges selected fairly reflect society:
The process and standards of judicial selection shall give due consideration to
the principle of fair reflection by the judiciary of the society in all its aspects.
Taking into consideration the principle of fair reflection by the judiciary of the
society in all its aspects, in the selection of judges, there shall be no
discrimination on the grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion,
national or social origin, property, birth or status, subject however to
citizenship requirements.
160 See Shetreet, Models of ConstitutionalAdjuication (cited in note 51) (emphasis added).
Vol 10 No. 1
The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law
The reflective approach moves away from the wording of the IBA
Standards of 1982, which talks of representation: "The process and standards ofjudicial selection must insure fair representation of all social classes, ethnic and
religious groups, ideological inclinations and where appropriate, geographical
regions. The representation should be fair and not numerical or accurately
proportional."16' The reflective approach is found in Article 2.13 of the Montreal
Declaration, which provides that "the process and standards of judicial selection
shall give due consideration to insuring a fair reflection by the judiciary of the
society in all its aspects.' 62 Section 2.17 of the Mt. Scopus Standards, taken from
the Montreal Declaration, continues to emphasize the judicial principle of
reflection rather than representation. 1
63
The opposite theoretical paradigm from the inclusionary model, on which
the principle of fair reflection is based, is the exclusionary model, in which a
judge must be disqualified in certain instances."6 Disqualification is not required
if no other judge can adjudicate the case or, because of urgent circumstances,
failure to act could lead to a serious miscarriage of justice. 65 Sections 18.1,166
18.2,167 19.1,168 and 20169 of the Mt. Scopus Standards lay down guidelines for the
161 See id.
162 Universal Declaration on the Independence ofJustice (cited in note 8).
163 Id, § 2.13. See also Shimon Shetreet, The Emerging TransnationalJurisrudence on Judicial Independence:
The IBA Standards and Montreal Declaration, in Shetreet and Deschfnes, eds, Judicial Independence: The
Contemporary Debate at 401 (cited in note 7).
164 Section 7.8 of the Mt. Scopus Standards states: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself from
participating in any proceedings in which the judge is unable to decide the matter impartially or in
which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the matter
impartially."
Section 8.9 states:
Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where: the judge
has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings; the judge previously
served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy; or
the judge, or a member of the judge's family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy.
165 This exception is known as the "principle of necessity." See, for example, Will, 449 US at 212-18.
166 Section 18.1 of the Mt. Scopus Standards states:
Judges shall not serve in a case in which they have previously served as agent,
counsel, advisor, advocate, expert or in any other capacity for one of the
parties, or as a member of a national or international court or other dispute
settlement body which has considered the subject matter of the dispute or in a
case where they had previously commented or expressed an opinion
concerning the subject matter in a manner that is likely to affect or may
reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality.
167 Section 18.2 states: "Judges shall not serve in a case with the subject matter of which they had
other forms of association that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence
or impartiality."
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disqualification of judges who have past links with a particular case or party to
avoid conflict-of-interest issues or judges having a potential interest in the
outcome of a particular case. These guidelines for disqualification, which judges
should proactively follow when applicable, serve the long-term interest of
preserving judicial independence by preserving the citizenry's faith in the
integrity of the justice system.
E. THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
JUDICIARY
The second professional international standard on judicial independence
and its normative impact is that of democratic accountability. Democratic
accountability demands that a state select the model of constitutional
adjudication that complements its method of judicial appointments, in order to
ensure that the judiciary's power to invalidate legislation corresponds with that
system's form of judicial appointments. Thus, in countries where judicial
selection procedures include democratic input and accountability, it is justifiable
to adopt an adjudicative model that grants the court power to invalidate
unconstitutional statutes. 170 In contrast, in models where the judiciary is
appointed on the basis of professional qualifications, but without democratic
input, this lack of democratic accountability should be taken into account and
one of two alternative elements of judicial review should be considered. The first
is that constitutional judgments of the court will be declaratory only, where the
judiciary would not have the power to invalidate a statute, but only the authority
to declare incompatibility between the law and the constitution. The second
model for resolving the lack of democratic accountability allows the court to
invalidate a statute, but provides for a parliamentary power to override this
invalidation. The legislature may either modify a statute to fit the court's
168 Section 19.1 states:
Judges shall not sit in any case involving a party for whom they have served as
agent, counsel, advisor, advocate or expert within the previous three years or
such other period as the court may establish within its rules; or with whom
they have had any other significant professional or personal link within the
previous three years or such other period as the court may establish within its
rules.
169 Section 20 states:
20.1: "Judges shall not sit in any case in the outcome of which they hold any material personal,
professional or financial interest."
20.2: "Judges shall not sit in any case in the outcome of which other persons or entities closely
related to them hold a material, personal, professional or financial interest."
20.3: "Judges must not accept any undisclosed payment from a party to the proceedings or any
payment whatsoever on account of a judge's participation in the proceedings."
170 See Shetreet, Models of ConstitutionalAdudicafion (cited in note 51).
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constitutional interpretation, or else decline altogether to engage in statutory
modification. The first alternative is best expressed by the United Kingdom's
declaratory model, whereas the Canadian system best illustrates the second.
1. The Dilemma of Constitutional Adjudication
An analysis of the models of constitutional adjudication reveals this link
between the scope of judicial review and the provision for democratic
accountability. 7 ' Underlying the principle of constitutionality is the concept that
limiting the power of the legislative branch may be justified in proper
circumstances. This idea is widely accepted in most systems of government, in
spite of the dilemma raised by the constitutional restrictions imposed on the
legislative branch in representative democracies.
This dilemma relates to the democratic legitimacy of constitutional
adjudication, and the nature of the method of constitutional settlement of
disputes in each society.1 2 The constitutional power of the judiciary to review
discretionary decisions of the democratic, representative legislative branch
requires that the exercise of this power by the supervising judicial authority be
subject to a set of rules aimed at the prevention of judicial abuse of power.
These rules are required because of the inherent problems with nondemocratic
accountability in the exercise of judicial review by the courts, for while the
judicial review is based on basic values, the exercise of the power is not subject
to democratic accountability.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the judiciary usually serves for long
periods, sometimes for life and mostly until retirement age. Therefore,
accountability is more diminished than that of the political branches of
government, whose members are subject to strict accountability and periodic
reelection procedures, normally after four years and sometimes even more
frequently.
It should be noted that there is nothing deficient in the fact that the judicial
branch has different forms of selection and appointment than the political
branches. However, the fact that the judicial branch exercises judicial review
over legislative judgments while exercising constitutional adjudication and, yet, is
not subject to any accountability is clearly contrary to the doctrine of separation
171 See Yoav Dotan, Judicial Review and Accountabiity: A Comparative Anajysis, 2007 Mishpat Umimshal
10-2.
172 See, for example, Ruth Gavison, The Constitutional Revolution: Descrition of Reako or a Sef-Fulfilled
Prophesy, 28 Mishpatim 23, 28-32 (1997); Yoav Doran, Constitution for Israel? The Constitutional
Dialogue after the Constitutional Revolution, 27 Mishpatim 149 (1996); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs
Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L J 1013, 1030-31, 1045-47 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U Chi L Rev 633, 638, 647 (1991).
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of powers and the principle of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism includes the
idea that executive, legislative, and judicial legitimacy depends on that branch
respecting the limits to its powers. Judicial review is a limit to the power of the
political branches in that judges are less prone to external pressures than
politicians and legislatures. However, this very detachment brings with it the
associated danger of unaccountability. Hence, the dilemma of constitutional
adjudication is thus: an undemocratically appointed court is a good foil for rash
governments but in turn is incongruent with the principles of constitutionalism,
balanced government, and democracy.
2. Possible Responses to the Dilemma of Constitutional Adjudication
There are a number of possibilities open to constitutional framers in
resolving the issue of the accountability of the judicial branch with regard to
constitutional adjudication. One option, though challenging to achieve, is to
draft a constitution in a precise manner, using detailed and specific rules, so that
the constitution guides its judges in the exercise of judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes.'73 This is not a preferred strategy since constitutions
are normally drafted in broad terms and leave wide discretion for the judiciary to
travel far from the original intention of the founding framers of the constitution,
particularly when the judiciary uses methods of objective interpretation that are
not closely linked to the text, but rather to the purpose of the legislation and the
values of the system.174
A second strategy focuses on the method of the selection of judges. The
solution offered by the American model is to promote the accountability of
judicial power by giving all courts the power of judicial review, but
circumscribing that power by ensuring democratic input into the federal and
state systems of judicial appointments. 75
The European model, adopted by several countries, including Germany
and Italy, attempts to resolve this dilemma of democratic accountability with
regard to constitutional adjudication by entrusting the power of judicial review
not to the ordinary court system, but rather to constitutional courts. These
courts meet requirements of democratic accountability by providing for special
procedures for selection of their members. This view recognizes that
173 See P.P. Craig, Administrative Law 3 (Sweet & Maxwell 3d ed 1994); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administraive Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667, 1694-95 (1975).
174 For the objective method of interpretation, see Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democray (Princeton
2006); Aharon Barak, Parsbanut Takblitit Be-misbpat 239 (Nevo 2003); Aharon Barak, Parsanut Bam-
mispat 165 (Nevo 1993).
175 See Judith Resnik, JuditialSeletion and Democralic Theoy: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 Cardozo
L Rev 579, 593-94 (2005).
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constitutional adjudication requires a wider value-oriented approach and also
that the European career judiciary in the ordinary court system cannot
adequately ensure democratic accountability." 6 Normally, the process of election
of members of the separate constitutional court is more political than the
appointment in the ordinary system, which is primarily based on judicial
career.
177
Thus, the incongruence between an undemocratic and unaccountable court
having the ultimate power over an accountable political branch is at least
partially resolved. Section 4.2 of the Mt. Scopus Standards recognizes this strategy.
It considers as legitimate the possibility of democratic input into the selection of
judges:
a) The principle of democratic accountability should be respected and
therefore it is legitimate for the Executive and the Legislature to play a role
in judicial appointments provided that due consideration is given to the
principle of judicial Independence.
b) The recent trend of establishing judicial selection boards or commissions
in which members or representatives of the Legislature, the Executive, the
Judiciary and the legal profession take part, should be viewed favourably,
provided that a proper balance is maintained in the composition of such
boards or commissions of each of the branches of government. 178
There are other models in addition to the introduction of democratic input
into the process of judicial appointments. One is to resolve the issue of the lack
of accountability and the possible conflict between the branches of government
by providing that the court can only declare incompatibility between a
parliamentary statute and constitutional provisions, but the parliament (possibly
together with the executive) must decide what to do next. It may abolish the
statutory provision that has been declared incompatible, it may amend it, or it
may leave it as is. This is the model adopted in the United Kingdom where the
basic norm is not a constitutional one but borrowed from the ECHR and
adopted into the law.
Another model designed to respond to the lack of accountability in the
judiciary is the common law model. The common law model focuses on
restricting the scope of judicial review and abstention from rigid constitutions,
thus resolving the issue of the lack of judicial accountability by restricting the
176 This is the reason for the criticism regarding the absence of term limitations for federal justices.
See id at 615-16; David R. Stras and Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a "Golden
Parachute", 83 Wash U L Q 1397, 1426 (2006).
177 See generally Shetreet and Desch~nes, eds, Judicial Independence (cited in note 77); John Bell,
Judiciaries within Europe: A Comparative Review (Cambridge 2006).
178 Mt. Scopus Standards, § 4.2(a), (b) (cited in note 4).
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circumstances under which the judiciary will find itself in a position where it
overrides legislative decisions.'79
Rigid constitutionalism was adopted only in federal common law states
such as Canada and Australia, in order to regulate the interrelationship between
their federal and provincial units. There is even more justification to restricting
the scope of judicial review in these countries, for they have a professional
process of judicial appointment with limited democratic input. °80 However, as
noted earlier, the dilemma of judicial accountability can be resolved by coupling
the power of judicial review with a legislative override or amending power,
allowing the legislature to reverse judicial resolutions. This has been Canada's
solution to the dilemma.
The democratic accountability of the courts, a building block to the
attainment of constitutionalism, helps ensure the existence of the rule of law.
With the rule of law, in addition to the intrinsic benefits enjoyed by society, the
courts' legitimacy is enhanced, further strengthening judicial independence. The
underlying principle of the rule of law is provided for in Section 1 of the Mt.
Scopus Standard. "The significance of the Independence of the Judiciary [is to]
ensure that all people are able to live securely under the rule of law." Bringing
this principle to fruition inevitably leads us to the various models of the
democratic accountability of the judiciary. As phrased by a Canadian judge, Mr.
Justice Riddell, "Judges are the servants, not the masters.... Servants are
accountable, so are judges."''
179 Canada's system of constitutional-override allows Parliament to declare that certain types of
legislation shall operate notwithstanding their unconstitutionality, on the condition that
Parliament makes this declaration expressly, and that such declaration expires after five years. The
wording is as follows:
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section
2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made
under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but
for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five
years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the
declaration. Canada Const, § 33.
180 See Yoav Dotan and David A.R. Williams, TheJudidalAppointment Process, 2004 NZ L Rev 39, 34-
44, 47-48; Mita Bhattacharya and Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence:
Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J Legal Studies 223, 229-32 (2001);
Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law 398 (Penguin 7th ed
1994).
181 See Shetreet, Judicial Independence at 593 (cited in note 7) (referring to Davis Aceylene Gas Co v
Morrison, [1915] 34 OLR 155, 23 DLR 871 (Canada)). See also Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982, ch 11, § 33 (1982) (UK).
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VII. THE NORMATIVE CYCLE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL LAW ON MATTERS RELATING TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
During the second and third phases of judicial independence, where
domestic law influences the international, and international moves the national, a
normative effect is created whereby common principles are widely applied,
regardless of borders. The United Kingdom, Austria, and Canada will be
examined in this section in order to provide a series of examples of the
normative cycle of law on matters relating to judicial independence.
A. THE CASE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom's adoption of European human rights conventions
over the last decades has significantly influenced the position of its judiciary in
relation to judicial independence. One of the most important of the
constitutional laws was the Human Rights Act, which adopted into British law
the ECHR. A second significant constitutional law has been the Constitutional
Reform Act, which received royal assent in March 2005.
1. The Normative Effect of the ECtHR on Domestic Law
Decisions of the ECtHR with respect to judicial independence, including
McGonnell,18 2 Procola,8 3 and Findlay,'84 meant that many UK practices were in
apparent violation of the ECtHR's interpretation of judicial independence. One
of the objectionable practices was the melding of the executive and judicial roles,
specifically that of the UK's Lord Chancellor, who simultaneously acted as
speaker of the House of Lords, member of the Prime Minister's executive
cabinet, and head of the judiciary.'85 It may be recalled that the relevant ECtHR
cases held that with regard to judicial independence, involvement in executive
functions disqualifies office holders from exercising judicial functions. 86
182 McGonnell, 30 Eur HR Rep at 289.
183 Procola, 326 Eur Ct HR at 326.
184 Findlay, 24 Eur HR Rep at 221.
185 For analysis of the office of the Lord Chancellor, see Dawn Oliver, The Lord Chancellor, the Judicial
Committee of the Priy Council and Devolution, 1999 Pub L 1; Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional
Law 314-17, 328, 331 (Butterworths 2d ed 1999); Diana Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor,
1998 Pub L 617. See generally Lord Mackay, The Lord Chancellor in the 1990s, 44 Current Legal
Probs 241 (1991); Lord Hailsham, The Office of Lord Chancellor and the Separation of Powers, 8 Civ
Justice Q 308 (1989).
186 See generally Richard Comes, McGonnel v UK, the Lord Chancellor and the Law Lords, 2000 Pub L
166.
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As a consequence of these decisions, the Lord Chancellor began to refrain
from sitting on appeals in the House of Lords in cases involving the
government, in contrast to earlier practice. This de facto change took place
without any formal statutory amendments. Rather, it was done based on the
concern that if the Lord Chancellor continued to sit on appeals in matters of
government involvement, such actions might bring about a challenge before the
ECtHR, as some UK counsel indicated that they would do. 8 ' Hence,
international judicial independence jurisprudence had a restraining effect.'88
In 1998, the Human Rights Act'89 was enacted, which finally and formally
applied the ECHR into British Law through reference by providing that, as far
as possible, legislation enacted both before and after the act would be
interpreted and enforced in a manner consistent with the rights protected by the
ECHR. This was a significant advancement, formally integrating the
international jurisprudence into the domestic realm.'
2. The Effect of the Human Rights Act
After the Human Rights Act was implemented, three important changes
took place in the United Kingdom that impacted the normative effect of
legislation on judicial independence. The first was that rights included in the
ECHR formally became part of British constitutional law. Secondly, upon the
constitutionalization of the ECHR into British law, all authorities were under a
duty to respect these rights, 9 ' including courts, which found themselves in a
position to review British legislation in light of the ECHR. As part of this
reform, the British courts were authorized to issue a declaration of
187 Prior to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act, there was no concern that the matter
would be brought before the British courts. Under English law international treaties do not
become part of domestic law unless and until a legislative vehicle so provides.
188 For details of the sitting of lord chancellors, see the account given in the House of Lords by Lord
Irvine in 597 HL Deb 738 (Feb 17, 1999). See generally Brice Dickson and Paul Carmichael, eds,
The House of Lords: Its Par'amentary and Judicial Roles (Hart 1998).
189 Human Rights Act 1998, arts 2-4.
190 Prior to the formal implementation of the UK Human Rights Act, the courts were apt to use the
ECHR and its related jurisprudence as a source of domestic law in a number of ways: as sources
of public policy (the United Kingdom had signed and ratified the convention), as a source when
there was an absence of domestic statutory provision, or when a domestic statute was difficult to
interpret.
191 There has also been an effect on UK governmental policy formation. See Department of
Constitutional Affairs, Retiew of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act 4 (DCA UK 2006).
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incompatibility if they decided that British legislation was incompatible with the
ECHR.
192
It is important to emphasize that the authority to annul is not in the hands
of the courts. However, a declaration of incompatibility by the courts is a means
of encouraging Parliament to amend the law so that it will not contradict the
domestic Human Rights Act.'93
The advantage of this model is that it lessens potential frictions between
the courts and the political branches. By merely declaring legislation
incompatible, the legislature is left with the ultimate legislative decision. This
relative detachment of the courts helps avoid public debates that might
otherwise adversely affect the courts' position in society.
In the year 2000, the year the Human Rights Act came into force, 4,811
claims were issued at the Administrative Court Office. This number increased to
5,364 in 2001, and to 6,006 in 2002.11 Since October 2000, English courts have
declared numerous provisions of parliamentary legislation incompatible with the
ECHR 95 Most cases were ruled on by the Court of Appeal and a few were
adjudicated by the House of Lords. 96
The declarations of incompatibility included cases dealing with mental
health, immigrants' rights, reproductive issues, marriage registration for
transgendered individuals, anti-terror measures, criminal law, and equality issues
between widows and widowers. In most cases, Parliament subsequently
amended the statutes that were declared incompatible, in order to make them
compatible with the ECHR, including statutes dealing with mental health, 19
192 Benjamin Goold, Liora Lazarus, and Gabriel Swiney, Public Protection, Proportionably, and the Search
for Balance 17 (Oxford 2007), available online at <www.justice.gov.uk/docs/270907.pdf> (visited
Apr 23, 2009).
193 See Human Rights Act 1998, § 20(1). See also Lord Lester of Herne Hill and David Pannick, eds,
Human Rights Law and Pratice 43 (Butterworths 1999).
194 Varda Bondy, The Impact of the Human Rights Act on Judicial Review: An Empirical Research Study 9
(Public Law Project 2003), available online at <http://www.pubhliclawproject.org.uk/downiloads/
HumRghtsJRRep03.pdf> (visited on Apr 23, 2009).
195 Review of the Implementation of the Human Rights Act at 4 (cited in note 191). As of 2006, there were
nineteen cases in all.
196 See, for instance, Belnger v Bellinger, [2003] UKI-IL 21, nn 193-196 (HL 2003) (UJK) (Declaration
of Incompatibility in relation to Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973).
197 In Regina v Mental Health Review Tribunalfor the North and East London Region & The Secretagy of State
for Health, [2001] 3 WLR 512 (CA 2001) (UK), the court concluded that Sections 72 and 73 of the
Mental Health Act 1983 were incompatible with Article 5(1) and 5(4) of the ECHR due to the
failure to require a Mental Health Review Tribunal to discharge a patient where it could not be
shown that he was suffering from a mental disorder that warranted detention. In Regina v Secretay
of State for Health, [2003] UKHL 13 (IHL 2003) (UK), the court decided that Section 2 of the
Mental Health Act was incompatible with Article 5(4) of the ECHR insofar as it was not attended
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detention of prisoners,"' and matters of privacy and the liberty of the body."9
The cases that were reversed on appeal dealt with claims of lack of impartiality,
consumer protection and the Crown's immunity.
20 0
3. The Dramatic Reform in the Powers of the Lord Chancellor over
the Judiciary: The Constitutional Reform Act
The Human Rights Act had a very significant impact on judicial
independence in England, including the recognition of the need to separate
between the executive and judiciary in matters related to adjudication and judges.
As noted above, there were some concerns that the Lord Chancellor sat on
by provision for the reference to a court of the case of an incompetent patient detained under
Section 2 in circumstances where a patient has a right to make application to the Mental Health
Tribunal but the incompetent patient is incapable of exercising that right; and it was not attended
by a right for a patient to refer his case to a court when his detention was extended by the
operation of section 29(4).
198 In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 14 (HL 2005) (UK), the court
ruled that Section 74 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was incompatible with Article 5(4) on the
ground that the continued detention of discretionary life prisoners who had served the penal part
of their sentence depended on the exercise of a discretionary power by the executive branch of
government to grant access to a court. In FHR v Secretagy of State for the Home Department, [2002]
UK1-L 46, the court decided that Section 29 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 was incompatible
with the right under Article 6 to have a sentence imposed by an independent and impartial
tribunal in that the secretary of state decided on the minimum period which must be served by a
mandatory life sentence prisoner before he was considered for release on license. In Regina v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, exparte Uttley [2004] 1 WLR 2278 (HL 2004), the court
concluded that Sections 33(2), 37(4)(a), and 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 were
incompatible with the claimant's rights under Article 7 of ECHR on the ground that they
provided that he would be released at the two-thirds point of his sentence on license with
conditions and be liable to be recalled to prison.
199 In Re McR's Application for Judicial Review (unreported), available online at
<http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/3948996D-EBFI-4FlC-B30E-lAFA7F4DBC47
/0/jjKERF3576.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2009), the court concluded that Section 62 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (attempted sodomy), which continued to apply in
Northern Ireland, was incompatible with Article 8 of ECHR to the extent that it interfered with
consensual sexual behavior between individuals.
200 In Regina (Alconbuty Developments Lid) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions,
[2003] 2 AC 295 (HL 2001) (UK), the court ruled that the Secretary of State's powers to
determine planning applications were in breach of Article 6(1), on the ground that the Secretary
of State was policymaker as well as the decisionmaker. A number of provisions were found to be
in breach of the principle of impartiality, including the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, §§
77, 78, and 79 (1990) (UK). In Wilson v First County Trust Lid (No 2), [2004] 1 AC 816 (HL 2003)
(UK), it was held by the court that Section 127(3) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 was
incompatible with Article 6 and Article 1, Protocol 1 of the ECHR because it resulted in
unjustified restriction on a creditor's enjoyment of contractual rights, but the House of Lords
reversed the declaration. In Matthews v Ministry of Defence, [2003] 1 AC 1163 (HL 2003) (UK),
which dealt with the Crown's immunity in tort, it was decided that Section 10 of the Crown
Proceedings Act 1947 was incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR for the reason that it was
disproportionate to any aim that it had been intended to meet.
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appeals in the House of Lords while still a member of the cabinet, and that this
was in contravention to ECtHR jurisprudence, including McGonnel, Procola, and
Findlay.2 ' In response to these concerns, the Constitutional Reform Act enacted
a new judicial order in the United Kingdom.
The major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act include
limiting the Lord Chancellor's powers by entrusting him solely with authority
over administrative and executive matters, not judicial. All of the Lord
Chancellor's judicial functions and responsibilities were transferred to the Lord
Chief Justice, clearly separating executive from judicial functions.0 2 The act also
created the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, replacing the House of
Lords as the court of last resort and passing the latter body's entire jurisdiction
onto the former. In addition, it introduced a major reform in the method of
judicial appointments, establishing judicial panels and a nominating commission
that selects the public members that will serve on the commission and devise a
list of recommended judges. The Lord Chancellor now heads the Department of
Constitutional Affairs and appoints judges from a recommended list proposed
by the judicial panels for judicial appointments.
A further change is that the Constitutional Reform Act imposed a duty on
all ministers of the government to uphold judicial independence by way of
Section 3, which provides that "The Lord Chancellor, other Ministers of the
Crown and all with responsibility for matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise
to the administration of justice must uphold the continued independence of the
judiciary" and that the "Lord Chancellor and other Ministers of the Crown must
not seek to influence particular judicial decisions through any special access to the
judiciary." Finally, the Constitutional Reform Act also established a Judicial
Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman for judges.203
In England, many of these changes stemmed from the normative impact of
international law and its surrounding jurisprudence. The ECtHR and its
jurisprudence were significant factors in the enactment of the United Kingdom's
201 See generally Comes, McGonnel v UK, the Lord Chancellor and the Law Lords (cited in note 186).
202 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, Bfitish Government and the Constitution (Cambridge 6th ed 2007);
David Pollard, Neil Parpworth, and David Hughes, Constitutional and Administrative Law: Text with
Materials 44-49 (Oxford 4th ed 2007). For earlier comments, see A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing,
Constitutional and Administrative Law 388 (Longman 14th ed 2007); Diana Woodhouse, The
Constitutional and Political Implications of a United Kingdom Supreme Court, 24 J Legal Studies 134, 135
(2004); Woodhouse, Office of Lord Chancellor 15-38 (cited in note 185).
203 Section 7 of the Act deals with the powers of the Lord Chief Justice. Among these powers is the
ability to hold the position of President of the Courts of England and Wales. He serves as the
head of the judicial branch-all judicial powers of the Lord Chancellor were transferred to him.
He is in charge of representing the views of the judiciary of England and Wales before
Parliament.
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Human Rights Act and Constitutional Reform Act, which in turn have had an even
more dramatic domestic impact.
B. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE ON
SCOTLAND
The case law and legislation in Scotland dealing with the position of judges
and their independence has also been significantly influenced by the ECtHR and
its jurisprudence, particularly with regard to the right to be tried before an
independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 of the convention.
In the case of Starrs and Chalmers v PF Linithgow,04 the Court ruled that an
appointment dependent on the discretion of the minister of executive
government renders the judge not independent and violates the ECtHR,
following McGonnell.20 5 In Starrs, the Court ruled that temporary appointments of
judges deny them independence since their evaluation and the continuance of
their service depend upon the discretion of the executive branch. In Clany v
Caird,0 6 the Court distinguished the ruling in Starrs and ruled that the judicial
appointment for temporary, set periods is acceptable and not a violation of
Article 6 since judges are called to service when needed by the judicial branch
and not by the executive one.20 7
Later, legislation attempted to implement the conclusions from both of
these cases regarding temporary judges in Scotland. According to the law, it is
legitimate and proper to appoint a judge for a set period. At the end of that
period he may be reappointed. The law also sets limits on the number of
temporary judges and on the process of transfer of a judge from one position to
another.2 °8
Hence in Scotland, as in England, there was a normative effect on
domestic legislation due to international law.
C. THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC LAW AND THE ECTHR
JURISPRUDENCE ON AUSTRIA
Austria's situation is helpful in demonstrating how a culture of judicial
independence can be developed through the intertwining of domestic and
204 Starrs and Chalmers v PF Lnlitgow, [2000] JC 208 (Scotland).
205 McGonnell, 30 Eur HR Rep at 289.
206 Clang v Caird, [20001 SC 441 (Scotland).
207 Id.
208 Bail, Judicial Appointments, Etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, asp 9 (2000), available online at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotdand/acts2OOO/asp20000009enf1> (visited Apr 23,
2009).
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international law. The Austrian experience varies from that of the United
Kingdom in that Austria boasts a professional judiciary and a written
constitution that explicitly provides for judicial independence. However, as in
our case study of the United Kingdom, the ECHR has had a significant impact
on the domestic implementation of judicial independence standards in Austria.
It is instructive to consider how this framework, similar in some ways and varied
in others from that of the United Kingdom, has influenced the Austrian creation
of a culture of judicial independence.
Austrian courts provide legal protection for individuals by giving
individuals the constitutional right to have their disputes adjudicated by a
properly constituted court of law. The Austrian judiciary is staffed with
professional judges whose functions, legal status, and procedures for
appointment removal are defined in the Austrian Constitution (Articles 86,209
88210 and 88(a)211).
209 Austrian Const, art 86:
(1) Save as provided otherwise by this law, judges are appointed pursuant to
the proposal of the Federal Government by the Federal President or, by
reason of his authorization, by the competent Federal Minister; the Federal
Government or the Federal Minister shall obtain proposals for appointment
from the chambers competent through the law on the organization of the
courts.
(2) If a sufficient number of candidates is available, the proposal for
appointment to be submitted to the competent Federal Minister and to be
forwarded by him to the Federal Government shall comprise at least three
names, but if there is more than one vacancy to be filled at least twice as many
names as there are judges to be appointed.
210 Austrian Const, art 88:
(1) The law on the organization of the courts will prescribe an age limit upon
whose attainment judges will be put on the permanently retired list.
(2) Otherwise judges may be removed from office or transferred against their
will or superannuated only in the cases and ways prescribed by law and by
reason of a formal judicial decision. These provisions do not however apply to
transfers and retirements which become necessary through changes in the
organization of the courts. In such a case the law will lay down within what
period judges can without the formalities otherwise prescribed be transferred
and superannuated.
(3) The temporary suspension of judges from office may take place only by
decree of the senior judge or the higher judicial authority together with
simultaneous reference of the matter to the competent court.
211 Austrian Const, art 88a:
The law on the organization of the courts may provide for posts of substitute
judges assigned to a higher court. The number of such posts may not exceed
two per cent of the number of judge posts assigned to the subordinate courts.
The duties of the substitute judges in charge at subordinate courts shall in
accordance with the law on the organizations of the courts be determined by
the competent chamber of the higher court. Substitute judges may be
entrusted only with the substitution of judges of subordinated courts and only
if these judges are prevented from the discharge of their responsibilities or are
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Articles 87212 and 88 guarantee the independence of the judiciary. The
Austrian judiciary is not bound by previous decisions (there is no tradition of
legal precedent), although judges must issue decisions that pay obeisance to the
principles of legal certainty and equity. Judges are also free to ignore political
pressure in issuing their decisions. Judges are assigned permanently to a court
and the constitution provides for their removal through retirement only, or else
as "prescribed by law and by reason of a formal judicial decision," or through
court reorganizations. 213 The Austrian mandatory retirement age for judges is
sixty-five.
Judicial independence is given great protection by the fact that judges are
not transferable to another judicial post without their consent and by the crucial
role of the judiciary's personnel panel in the judicial appointment process. This
process of self-administration and self-discipline by the judiciary is required for
ensuring its independence. Cases are allocated through a case distribution plan,
in which a judge may be prevented from hearing an assigned case.214 This
distribution plan helps to preserve the independence of individual judges by
assuring an objective and impartial method of appointing judges to adjudicate a
particular case.
The separation-of-powers principle of the Austrian Constitution ensures
that no judge may concurrently serve in an administrative or legislative capacity.
Judges may be prevented from participating in a specific proceeding if there is a
potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, judges are automatically excluded if
they are a party to the dispute, if a family member or professional associate is
party to the dispute, or if a judge has previously served as either representative
or judge in a previous matter involving one of the parties. Section 88(a) of the
unable to cope with their duties, due to the extent of these, within a reasonable
time.
212 Austrian Const, art 87:
(1) Judges are independent in the exercise of their judicial office.
(2) A judge is in the exercise of his judicial office during the
performance of any judicial function properly his by law and the allocation of
business, though to the exclusion of the judiciary's administrative business
which in accordance with the provisions of the law shall not be discharged by
chambers or commissions.
(3) Business shall be allocated in advance among the judges of a court
for the period provided by the law on the organization of the courts. A matter
devolving upon a judge in accordance with this allocation may be removed
from his jurisdiction by decree of the judiciary's administrative authorities only
in case of his being prevented from the discharge of his responsibilities or his
being unable to cope with his duties, due to their extent, within a reasonable
time.
213 Austrian Const, art 8, % (1), (2).
214 W. Rechenberger, The Impact of the ECHR Judicature on the Austrian Practice in the Field of Judidal
Independence, Proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference (2008).
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Austrian Constitution makes provisions for "substitute" judges to higher courts,
but only so long as they do not make up more than 2 percent of subordinate
court judicial posts.
Austria, like other countries in Europe, also has a constitutional court,
which examines the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation, the legality of
ministerial regulations, and investigates alleged constitutional infringements of
individual rights by the state. The constitutional court also tries jurisdictional
questions with regard to other courts, resolves disputes between the federation
and its member states, and sits on impeachment proceedings involving the
federal president.
Hence it can be seen that in Austria there is a written constitutional judicial
independence framework in place. In addition, as is the case in the previous case
study of the United Kingdom, a normative effect on internal judicial
independence is created by international law. Whenever procedural guarantees
found in Article 6 of the ECHR are violated-in other words, where a tribunal's
formation are held not to follow the appropriate standards of independence and
impartiality-a decision may be reversed. Austria thus strives to fulfill its
obligations under the ECHR by following its precepts and by amending
noncompliant domestic laws.
An example of this was Sramek v Austria, where Austria was accused of
violating Article 6 because the authority adjudicating real estate transactions,
Tiroler Landesgrundverkersbeb'rde, did not appear to be an independent and
impartial tribunal. Since, and on account of, this ruling, the Tiroler Landesgrund-
verkehrsbehdrde has been separated from the government.
215
D. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
CANADIAN DOMESTIC LAW OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Like Austria, Canadian constitutional documents provide the domestic
framework for judicial independence. These documents include sections 96
through 100 of the Constitution Act 1867, which provided for the appointment
of superior court judges, their financial security, and security of tenure. The
preamble of the Act also provided for a constitution "similar in Principle to that
of the United Kingdom," thus incorporating by reference UK principles of
judicial independence dating back to the 1701 Act of Settlement.
In addition, various Canadian Supreme Court judgments have strengthened
the principle of judicial independence by giving a broad reading to these
215 Sramek vAustria, 84-I Eur Ct HR (set A) (1984).
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constitutional provisions.216 One of the main constitutional principles with
regard to judicial independence states that judges are subordinate only to the law
itself.2 17 In Re Provincial Court Judges, the importance of judicial independence was
explained:
Judicial independence is valued, because it serves important societal goals-
it is a means to secure those goals. One of these goals is the maintenance of
public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to
the effectiveness of the court system. Independence contributes to the
perception that justice will be done in individual cases. Another social goal,
served by judicial independence is the maintenance of the rule of law, one
aspect of which is the constitutional principle that the exercise of all public
power must find its ultimate source in a legal rule.218
Judicial independence has been given concrete form in Canada through its
case law and government declarations. An example dating back almost five
decades occurred in 1961, when the Prime Minister declared that no minister
save for the Minister of Justice is permitted to make any contact with a judge
regarding a pending judicial case.219
One of Canada's early pivotal cases regarding judicial independence was
Valente v theQueen. In its judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada listed the three
main components of judicial independence220 -security of tenure, financial
security, and institutional independence.22' Importantly, the Court held that
judicial independence needs to be considered not only from an objective
perspective, but also subjectively. The subjective perspective looks at whether a
common person would believe in any particular situation that judicial
independence exists.222 This dual objective and subjective perspective is common
in many of the professional standards on judicial independence and
demonstrates how international and national laws create normative standards
common to both.
216 See, for example, Valente, [1985] 2 SCR 673 (Canada), and Re Prvindal Court Judges, [19971 3 SCR 3
(Canada).
217 See Shetreet, Judges on Trial, ch I (cited in note 1). This is an element of substantive independence,
provided for in the Mt. Scopus Standards, § 2.2.2 (cited in note 4) ("Substantive independence
means that in the discharge of his judicial function, a judge is subject to nothing but the law and
the commands of his conscience.').
218 Re Provindial Court Judges, [1997] 3 SCR 3 (Canada).
219 See Russell, The Judiciary in Canada at 35-39 (cited in note 20). See also Nihal Jayawickrama, The
Judicial Application of Human RIghts Law: National, Regional and International Juprudence 513-18
(Cambridge 2002); Shetreet, Justice in Israel (cited in note 89).
220 Valente, [1985] 2 SCR 673 (Canada).
221 Id.
m Id.
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Consider section 18 of the Mt. Scopus Standards, which uses the objective
test in dealing with the grounds for this qualification of judges in cases of
suspicion of bias.223 Other sections such as 16,224 17,225 21,226 22,227 and 23228
include subjective parameters.
In the case of EII v Alberta,229 the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that life
tenure is a crucial component in judicial independence; that judicial
independence is an important value for all judges, regardless of their position or
the place of their service; and that all judges are entitled to the same amount of
independence.23 °
223 Mt. Scopus Standards, § 18 (cited in note 4):
Section 18.1:
Judges shall not serve in a case in which they have previously served as agent,
counsel, advisor, advocate, expert or in any other capacity for one of the
parties, or as a member of a national or international court or other dispute
settlement body which has considered the subject matter of the dispute or in a
case where they had previously commented or expressed an opinion
concerning the subject matter in a manner that is likely to affect or may
reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality.
Section 18.2: "Judges shall not serve in a case with the subject matter of which they had other
forms of association that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence or
impartiality."
224 Id, § 16.1: "Judges shall enjoy freedom of expression and association. These freedoms must be
exercised in a manner that is compatible with the judicial function and that may not affect or
reasonably appear to affect judicial independence or impartiality."
225 Id, §17: "Judges shall not engage in any extra-judicial activity that is incompatible with their
judicial function or the efficient and timely functioning of the court of which they are members,
or that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality."
226 Id,§ 21.1:
Judges shall exercise appropriate caution in their personal contacts with
parties, agents, counsel, advocates, advisors, and other persons and entities
associated with a pending case. Any such contacts should be conducted in a
manner that is compatible with the judicial function and that may not affect or
reasonably appear to affect the judge's independence and impartiality.
227 Id, § 22.1: "Judges shall not serve in a case with the subject-matter of which they have had any
other form of association that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence
or impartiality."
Id, § 22.2: "Judges shall not seek or accept, while they are in office, any future employment,
appointment or benefit, from a party to a case on which they sat or from any entity related to
such a party that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence or
impartiality."
228 Id, § 23.2: "Each court shall establish appropriate procedures to enable judges to disclose to the
court and, as appropriate, to the parties to the proceedings matters that may affect or may
reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality in relations to any particular case."
229 EllvAlberta, [2003] 1 SCR 857 (Canada).
230 Id.
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Canada is an example of a country providing strong protection to judicial
independence through domestic law and jurisprudence, and is instructive in
demonstrating how a strong constitutional basis to judicial independence creates
an upward spiral whereby judicial independence is further and further
reinforced.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE FUTURE
In this study, it is evident that national law has had a strong influence on
international law (the first phase). Later, in the second phase, international law
gained force of its own through treaties, conventions, regional arrangements,
and extensive jurisprudence. Later, in the third phase, this international law
began to influence national laws, such as in the UK, where the concept of
judicial independence began.
This Article has explored the rich culture of judicial independence, showing
how the concept has moved from its first phase of domestic development, such
as in England with the 1701 Act of Settlement; through its second phase, by the
seeping of these concepts into the international scene, influencing international
and regional laws; and onto the third phase by the re-domestication of newly
reformulated international principles of judicial independence. It has shown how
countries have gradually been influenced by the international law on judicial
independence. The United Kingdom, Austria, and Canada have all proven to be
good illustrations of this movement.
Gradually, with the normative impact and interrelationship of national and
international law, an ever-firmer culture of judicial independence has flourished.
Both encouraging this construction, and also in response to it, have been the
working and reworking of domestic and international law regarding judicial
independence, and the development of professional standards on the subject,
including the 2008 Mt. Scopus Standards, the contemporary revision of standards
for both national and international judges. The development of the Mt. Scopus
Standards was necessitated by the absence of a recent, thorough revision of
standards. In order for standards to remain current and relevant and to continue
to act as cornerstones for the substantive protection of human rights and a
healthy economic state, it is critical that they also be contemporary. We have
examined the impact of international professional standards over the last
decades and their normative effects on the culture of judicial independence.
The United Kingdom is a model example of the normative effect of the
cross-pollination and fertilization of domestic with international law. The first
phase of judicial independence began with the 1701 Act of Settlement, which
began to create in England the culture of Judicial Independence. In its second
phase, these laws moved into the international arena, having a normative effect
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on judicial independence not only in the international and regional realms, but
also in other domestic environments. In its third phase of judicial independence,
these normative principles, concepts and doctrines seeped back into the United
Kingdom, creating dramatic changes in its judicial independence fabric,
including the enactment of the significant Human Rights Act and Constitutional
Reform Act.
It is wise to extrapolate from these examples and question what other
changes this interrelationship between the international and the national will
bring in the realm of judicial independence. One area that may soon be affected
is that of administrative tribunal judges and administrative judges that hear cases
in administrative agencies. There is an ongoing debate in the United States on
what is referred to in England as "tribunal judiciary" and in the United States as
"administrative judges." The issue is to the extent to which the existing practice
of administrative judges acting within administrative agencies can be defined as
impartial and independent.23" ' It is possible that other jurisdictions will follow the
United Kingdom's lead in the form of its legislation providing that judicial
independence must be guaranteed to "tribunal judiciary., 2
32
Scholars should pay heed to the issue of judicial independence not only as
it applies to the high level judiciary, which is the level most relevant to the rule
of law and human rights, but also to lower court judges, tribunal judges, and
administrative judges, and other judicial officers. This is critical, for the issue of
judicial independence is equally important to the citizen whose matter is
adjudicated before one of these levels as it is to the person whose case is heard
before a supreme court. It seems that the development of the culture of judicial
independence is moving in this direction.233
The idea of normative cycle of national law and international law in this
paper focuses on judicial independence; however, this is only one significant
illustration of this normative cycle. The same normative cycle can be found in
other areas of modern life, where one can observe a process of
internationalization of national laws. Other illustrations are in the area of money
231 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of
PerformanceEvaluationforALJs, 7 Admin LJ Am U 589, 613-17 (Fall 1993/Winter 1994); James P.
Timony, Performance Evaluation of FederalAdministrative Law Judges, 7 Admin L J Am U 629, 641 (Fall
1993/Winter 1994).
232 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, ch 15 (2007) (UK), available online at
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2007/ukpga_ 2 0070015-en-l> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
Section 1 amended the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (cited in note 16).
233 Suratt v Attorny-General of Trinidad and Tobago, [2007] UKPC 55 (UK).
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laundering, 23anti-corruption in corporate activities, copyright and intellectual236 .op.. . g-237
property rights, and criminal trials by international tribunals.
234 See, for example, EC Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament of the Council
amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose of money laundering, OJ 2001 L 344/76 (2001); UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances L326/24/11/1990/57 (1990); AND
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime, ETS 141 (1990). For an overview see, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, An Overview
of the UN Conventions and Other International Standards Concerning Anti-Money Laundering and the
Countering of Finances of Terrorism (an 2007), available online at
<http://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/Overview/2oUpdate_0107.pdf> (visited May 18, 2009).
235 See, for example, Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No 174 (1999);
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No 173 (1999); United
Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions,
A/RES/51/191 (1996).
236 See, for example, WIPO Copyright Treaty, 36 ILM 65 (1997); Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WO001EN (1971); Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization, WO029EN (1967);.
237 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 ILM 1002 (1998).
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